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I.  INTRODUCTION: THE CAUTIOUS EMBRACE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN 
FRENCH TORT LAW? 
When Americans Peter Schlenzka and Julie Langhorne purchased a 
French Fountaine Pajot catamaran in 1999, they probably did not expect that 
their purchase would lead to a groundbreaking decision from the French 
Court of Cassation, the highest court in France.1  At the time of the sale, 
Schlenzka and Langhorne were unaware that their new family boat had 
suffered serious structural damage during a storm only a few weeks earlier 
while still in France.  Shortly after delivery, however, they discovered the 
defect and demanded a refund from the catamaran’s French manufacturer.  
When settlement negotiations broke down, they brought suit against 
Fountaine Pajot in California.  In February 2003, the Superior Court of 
California ordered Fountaine Pajot pay Schlenzka and Langhorne more than 
$3 million, including nearly $1.5 million in punitive damages.2  After a long 
battle to try and enforce the judgment in France, the Court of Cassation 
handed down its final decision in late 2010.3  Although the Court refused to 
enforce the California court’s judgment, the decision was nonetheless 
remarkable in its recognition of the potential legality of punitive damage 
awards.4  Holding that “an award of punitive damages is not per se contrary 
to public policy,” the Court added that such principle did not apply in the 
Fountaine Pajot case “when the amount awarded is disproportionate with 
regard to the damage sustained . . . .”5  Though the decision signaled the 
death knell for Schlenzka and Langhorne’s claim, it has since sparked 
renewed debate about the proper role of punitive damages in the French tort 
system where courts have consistently held—at least until the Fountaine 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Dec. 1, 2010, Bull. 
civ. II, No. 248 [hereinafter Fountaine Pajot case]; see also Véronique Wester-Ouisse & 
Thomas Thiede, Punitive Damages in France: A New Deal?, 3 J. EUR. TORT L. 115 (2012) 
(discussing the case and its potential impact on punitive damages in French law); Nathalie 
Meyer Fabre, Enforcement of US Punitive Damages Award in France: First Ruling of the 
French Court of Cassation in X. v. Fountaine Pajot, December 1, 2010, 26 MEALEY’S INT’L 
ARB. REP. 15 (2011) (discussing the potential impact of the judgment in international 
arbitrations); François-Xavier Licari, Prendre les Punitive Damages au sérieux: critiques sur 
un refus d’accorder l’exequatur à une décision californienne ayant alloué des dommages-
intérêts punitifs, 137 J. DU DROIT INT’L 1230, 1237 (2010) (discussing the French trial and 
appellate court decisions in the Fountaine Pajot case).  The final decision from the Superior 
Court of California was not published. 
 2 The final judgment was for $3,253,734.45, including $1,391,650.12 for the refurbishment 
of the boat, $402,084.33 for attorney’s fees and $1,460,000.00 in punitive damages.  
Fountaine Pajot case, supra note 1. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
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Pajot case—that punitive damage awards were inconsistent with the 
principles underlying French tort law.6 
While punitive damages are an integral part of the common law legal 
systems of countries such as the United States,7 most civil law countries such 
as France usually disapprove of their award.8  Understood most generally, 
punitive damages are damages awarded in excess of the harm the plaintiff 
suffered in order to punish a tortfeasor and deter him or her and others from 
pursuing similar conduct.9  Guided by the principle of réparation intégrale 
(full reparation),10 the Court of Cassation has consistently held that tort victims 
should be compensated for the harm they suffer, but nothing more.11  Punitive 
damages have thus largely been absent—at least formally—from French law.  
When asked in 2004 whether French law permitted punitive damages, 
Professor Georges Durry, a prominent French academic gave a simple 
response: “No, three times, no.”12  The next year, however, Durry was part of 
                                                                                                                   
 6 See Meyer Fabre, supra note 1 (discussing the Fountaine Pajot case and the ambiguity 
regarding the proportionality principle applied by the Court of Cassation). 
 7 See, e.g., Michael L. Wells, A Common Lawyer’s Perspective on the European 
Perspective on Punitive Damages, 70 LA. L. REV. 557 (2010) (arguing that the different 
perspectives on punitive damages in common law and civil law jurisdictions is a result of path 
dependency and cultural factors); DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 381 (2000) (discussing 
the role of punitive damages in American tort law). 
 8 See, e.g., Jean-Sébastien Borghetti, Punitive Damages in France, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: 
COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW PERSPECTIVES 55 (Helmut Koziol & Vanessa Wilcox eds., 2009) 
(tracing the evolution of the punitive damages doctrine in French law); Helmut Koziol, Punitive 
Damages–A European Perspective, 68 LA. L. REV. 741 (2008) (arguing that punitive damages 
are fundamentally at odds with the principles underlying tort law in civil law jurisdictions). 
 9 Vanessa Wilcox, Punitive Damages in England, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: COMMON LAW 
AND CIVIL LAW PERSPECTIVES, supra note 8, at 7; Borghetti, supra note 8, at 55. 
 10 See, e.g., Borghetti, supra note 8, at 55 (noting that French courts have “constantly 
stuck” to the full reparation principle, requiring a victim be compensated for the harm suffered 
without getting any richer or poorer from it); Christian Lapoyade Deschamps, La réparation 
du préjudice économique pur en droit français, in CIVIL LIABILITY FOR PURE ECONOMIC LOSS 
89, 90 (Efstathios Banakas ed., 1996) (noting that the full reparation principle is part of the 
“dogma” of French law).  Part II of this Article includes a more detailed discussion of the full 
reparation principle. 
 11 See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., July 5, 
2001, Bull. civ. II, No. 135 (stating that “the award must compensate for the damages 
sustained without resulting in loss or profit for the victim”); Cour de cassation 
[Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., May 8, 1964, Bull. civ., No. 358 (holding 
that “[t]he indemnity required to compensate the damage incurred shall be calculated based on 
the amount of the damage, without any influence of the seriousness of the misconduct on the 
amount of said indemnity”). 
 12 Although Durry maintained that French law was governed by the full reparation principle, 
he did not deny that in some cases a party could recover more than his or her actual damages. 
Nevertheless, Durry did not consider these damages to be punitive because the idea of 
punishment was absent. Marie-France Steinlé-Feuerbach, Cour de Cassation: “Les punitives 
damages,” J. DES ACCIDENTS ET DES CATASTROPHES, Mar. 25, 2004, http://www.Iutcolmar.uha. 
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a team of legal academics and practitioners that authored the Avant-Projet de 
réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la prescription (Proposals for 
Reform of the Law of Obligations and the Law of Prescriptions).13  More 
commonly known as the Avant-Projet Catala (Avant-Projet), the project 
proposes the most extensive reform of the French Code civil (Civil Code) 
since it was written in 1804.  Notably, the Avant-Projet explicitly recognizes 
for the first time the award of punitive damages for the commission of 
certain torts under French law.14  While many French scholars and politicians 
have been quick to dismiss the proposal as contrary to existing French 
law15—inapposite with explicit principles of corrective justice and victim 
reparation that lay at the foundation of French tort law16—there has been a 
lack of critical engagement with the idea of awarding punitive damages in 
French tort cases.  This has caused some to question what led the authors to 
include the proposal in the Avant-Projet.17  In comparison with other parts of 
                                                                                                                   
fr/internet/recherche/Jcerdacc.nsf/0/72d84e1da263f747c1256e6e0029410b?OpenDocument.  
 13 Avant-Projet de réforme du droit des obligations (Articles 1101 à 1386 du Code civil) et 
du droit de la prescription (Articles 2234 à 2281 du Code civil), (Report to Pascal Clement, 
Minister of Justice), art. 1371 (Sept. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Avant-Projet de réforme du droit 
des obligations et du droit de la presecription], available at http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pi 
x/RAPPORTCATALASEPTEMBRE2005.pdf. 
 14 Id. art. 1371, which will be discussed later in this Article, provides for the possibility of 
judges awarding punitive damages where a person commits a manifestly deliberate fault, 
especially if done for a lucrative purpose. 
 15 See, e.g., Alain Anziani & Laurent Bétaille, Responsabilité civile: des évolutions 
nécessaires, III. C. Les dommages et intérêts punitifs: une innovation pertinente pour certains 
contentieux de la responsabilité, Senate Report (2009), http://www.senat.fr/rap/r08-558/r08-
558.html (discussing how victim compensation should result in neither a win nor a loss to the 
victim); David Corbé-Chalon & Martin A. Ragoff, Tort Reform à la Française: 
Jurisprudential and Policy Perspectives on Damages for Bodily Injury in France, 13 COLUM. 
J. EUR. L. 231, 294 (2007) (stating that “[t]he principles of total reparation as it is understood 
in France, with its requirements of adequacy and equivalence, excludes the possibility of 
[punitive] damages as the award of punitive . . . damages would not only unjustly enrich the 
victim but also confuse the civil nature of the action with the criminal nature of the award”); 
Jean-François Kriegk, L’américanisation de la justice, marque d’un mouvement de 
privatisation du droit et de la justice civile?, 95 LA GAZETTE DU PALAIS, Apr. 5, 2005, at 2, 8–
9 (examining how French law has evolved as a result of its interaction with American law). 
 16 See sources cited supra note 15. For a discussion of the principles underlying French tort 
law see, for example, NOOMAN GOMAA, THÉORIE DES SOURCES DE L’OBLIGATION 129 (1968) 
(noting that tort law should never be about the “prospering of one person at the expense of 
another,” but rather reestablishing “the equilibrium between members of society”). 
 17 See, e.g., Pierre Wessner, Les effets de la responsabilité civile dans la perspective d’une 
révision d’un Code civile français: quelques observations débridées d’un juriste suisse, 1 
REVUE DES CONTRATS 171 (2006) (arguing that punitive damages are not consistent with the 
principles underlying French tort law); Stéphane Piedelièvre, Les dommages et intérêts 
punitifs: une solution d’avenir, RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE ET ASSURANCES 68, 72 (special issue) 
(2001) (critiquing proposals for the introduction of punitive damages into French tort law).  
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the Avant-Projet, however, the proposal to award punitive damages has 
received surprisingly limited attention from academics, especially outside 
France.18  This Article begins to fill the gap in the existing debate, placing 
the Avant-Projet and more specifically the practice of awarding punitive 
damages in their historical and comparative context.  
In this Article, I argue that punitive damages are not fundamentally at 
odds with the principles underlying French tort law and that they may in fact 
support and further its policies.  Punitive damages provide a form of social 
redress, vindicating victim’s rights and publicly affirming society’s respect 
for the existence of these rights and its interest in ensuring its laws are 
respected.19  Punitive damages have the potential to restore the moral balance 
and provide compensation for the victim,20 consistent with French principles 
of corrective justice and victim reparation.21 
At the same time, however, punitive damages can also serve retributive 
and deterrent functions.22  This has led many scholars to sharply criticize 
their proposed introduction, arguing that these functions threaten to 
undermine the existing principles of French tort law.23  Nevertheless, this 
critique fails to recognize the implicit function retribution and deterrence 
already play in French tort law, and how a more explicit recognition of this 
function will strengthen the French tort system and better support its goals of 
victim reparation and restorative justice.24   
Situating my analysis and assessment in a comparative perspective, I 
begin in Part II of this Article by tracing the history of French tort law and its 
treatment of punitive damages.  In Part III, I contrast the French experience 
with that of other countries, especially the United States, looking at the 
rationales underlying punitive damages and their critiques.  Drawing on this 
analysis, in Part IV, I explore the Avant-Projet’s current draft proposal and 
make recommendations for how it can better respond to critics’ claims that it 
fails to reflect the policies guiding French tort law.  Against the backdrop of 
                                                                                                                   
 18 Paula Giliker, Codifying Tort Law: Lessons From the Proposals for Reform of the 
French Civil Code, 57 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 561, 561 (2008).  
 19 Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 57 (1993). 
 20 See Neil Vidmar & Matthew Wolfe, Punitive Damages, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 179, 
199 (2009) (stating that one study of punitive damages found that “punitive damages serve a 
restorative function, ameliorating the breach caused by the defendant’s reprehensible actions”). 
 21 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 22 Cass Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages, 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2075 (1998). 
 23 See, e.g., MIREILLE BACACHE-GIBEILI, LES OBLIGATIONS–LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE 
EXTRACONTRACTUELLE 486–87 (2007) (examining the functions of civil responsibility and 
arguing that punitive damages are not consistent with these functions in France); Piedelièvre, 
supra note 17, at 72 (suggesting that punitive damages are not well-suited for the French 
context). 
 24 See generally Borghetti, supra note 8, at 68–69 (describing punitive damages in France). 
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French legal history and the comparative experiences of other countries, I 
ultimately contend that punitive damages have the potential to become a 
useful tool in French tort law. 
II.  FRENCH TORT LAW AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES: AN HISTORICAL AND 
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
To understand the recent push to reform the French tort system, knowledge 
of current French tort law and its development is essential.  Before the French 
Revolution in 1789, there was no single, official French legal system.25  
Rather, French law was a mixture of Roman law, canon law, and local laws, 
commonly referred to by legal historians as l’ancien droit (the old law).26  
Shortly after coming to power in the aftermath of the French Revolution, 
Napoleon Bonaparte set out to create a new legal order in France.27  The Civil 
Code was adopted in 1804, and is still regarded as “the cement of [French] 
society.”28  The cornerstone of the French legal system, the Code incorporates 
many of the main ideas of the Revolution as well as several aspects of l’ancien 
droit.29  As a testament to its strength and continuity, the Code has been 
modified little in the more than two hundred years since its adoption, with 
most changes coming in the form of additions rather than amendments.30  Tort 
law provides a striking illustration of this durability, with four of the five 
articles currently governing torts having been included in the original Code.31 
The primary reason for such continuity is the simplicity and breadth of 
tort law under the Code.32  The general nature of the formulas employed in 
the Code has marked the French legal system and allowed judges to imbue 
them with meaning.33  At the most general level, the principle of fault most 
directly influences the French tort system.34  According to the Code, any 
person whose faulty conduct causes harm to another person has a duty to 
repair the damages he or she has caused.35  Guided by the “natural objective” 
                                                                                                                   
 25 CATHERINE ELLIOT & CATHERINE VERNON, FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 1 (2006). 
 26 Id.; CEES VAN DAM, EUROPEAN TORT LAW 41 (2006).  
 27 ELLIOT & VERNON, supra note 25, at 5. 
 28 Yves Lequette, Quelques remarques à propos du projet de code civil européen de M. von 
Bar, 28 RECUEIL DALLOZ 2202 (2002). 
 29 ELLIOT & VERNON, supra note 25, at 5. 
 30 ARTHUR VON MEHREN & JAMES GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 53 (1977). 
 31 RENÉ DAVID, ENGLISH LAW AND FRENCH LAW: A COMPARISON IN SUBSTANCE 151 (1980).   
 32 Geneviève Viney, Tort Liability, in INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 237, 237 (George 
Bermann & Etienne Picard eds., 2008); Richard Azarnia, Tort Law in France: A Cultural and 
Comparative Overview, 13 WIS. INT’L L.J. 471, 473 (1995). 
 33 Viney, supra note 32, at 237. 
 34 DAVID, supra note 31, at 150. 
 35 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1382 states: “Any act of a person which causes damage to another 
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of fully compensating victims for the harms they suffer, the French tort 
system is notable for its broad orientation towards liability.36  This is 
reflected, for example, in the way courts have increasingly softened the 
definition of fault over time and introduced presumptions of strict liability in 
certain cases.37  French courts have thus taken significant liberty in 
interpreting the provisions of the Code in different ways in light of changing 
times and circumstances despite the relatively static nature of the provisions 
themselves since their adoption more than two hundred years ago.38 
Growing out of increasing recognition of the Code’s inadequacy in 
modern times, however, an ambitious reform project was launched under the 
                                                                                                                   
is liable for repairing the damage.”  CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1383 states: “Everyone is liable for 
the damage caused not only by his or her acts, but also by his or her negligence or imprudence.” 
 36 Viney, supra note 32, at 237–38, notes that damages are assessed regardless of the 
seriousness of the fault and without regard to the foreseeability of the nature or scale of the 
damage caused.  Moreover, by rejecting the distinctions and restrictions that other judicial 
traditions have developed through their case-based analysis of factual situations (as in the 
United States), and through the creation of a hierarchy of interests to be protected (as in 
Germany), French tort law necessarily gives civil liability a broader scope. 
 37 See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] ch. réuns., Feb. 
13, 1930, D.P. I 1930, 57 (transforming the liability regime for a rebuttable fault for the 
damage caused by a thing into a strict liability regime).  For a full discussion of the historical 
development of French understandings of fault and strict liability, see CEES VAN DAM, supra 
note 26, at 41, 46–60.  As van Dam notes, French judges have interpreted some provisions of 
the Civil Code over the past 125 years to impose strict liability in certain cases.  According to 
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1384: 
[A] person is liable for the damage caused by the acts of persons for whom he 
or she is responsible or of objects that are in his or her custody. . . . The father 
and the mother, in the exercise of their parental authority, are liable for the 
damage caused by their minor children who live with them[;] masters and 
principals, for the damage caused by their servants and employees in the 
exercise of the functions for which they have been employed; [and] teachers 
and artisans, for the damage caused by pupils and apprentices during the time 
they were under their supervision.  The aforesaid liability attaches unless the 
father and mother, the teachers and the artisans can prove that they could not 
have prevented the act that gives rise to the liability. 
According to CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1385: “The owner of an animal, or the person using the 
animal at the time it causes damage, is liable for the damage the animal causes, whether the 
animal remained under the owner’s guard, or whether it strayed or escaped.”  According to CODE 
CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1383: “The owner of a building is responsible for the damage caused by its 
collapse, when this occurs as a result of the building’s poor maintenance or of its defective 
construction.”  Judges have increasingly read these provisions of the Civil Code to broaden the 
scope of the tortfeasor’s liability.  See, e.g., CEES VAN DAM, supra note 26, at 48–50 (discussing 
how, over time, the Court of Cassation has expanded France’s strict liability regime).  
 38 See generally Azarnia, supra note 32, at 475 (noting that the Code was intended to be a 
guideline and not a comprehensive description of tortious liability); DAVID, supra note 31, at 
151 (noting that the French Parliament has made few changes to the Code since adopted while 
the French courts have reinterpreted provisions of the Code to be consistent with current 
circumstances). 
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direction of Professor Pierre Catala and endorsed by the French Ministry of 
Justice in the wake of the Code’s two hundredth anniversary.39  The Avant-
Projet—the product of this reform movement—was written with the purpose 
of “giv[ing] France a civil law adapted to its time . . . .”40  Although its 
authors contend it was written in a spirit of continuity, not of revolution, its 
proposals are both widespread and significant.41 
The part of the Avant-Projet concerning tort liability was drafted by a 
group of scholars under the guidance of none other than Professor Georges 
Durry—the same French professor who three times affirmed that French tort 
law did not allow for the award of punitive damages—and his compatriot 
Professor Geneviève Viney.42  Beyond simply expanding upon existing 
notions of tort liability,43 the Avant-Projet provides significantly more 
guidance for courts when awarding tort damages.44  
Broadly speaking, the French tort system is dedicated to the principle that 
damages should serve to make the victim whole.45   The notion that damage 
must be repaired in full (known as réparation intégrale or “full reparation”) 
is absolute.46  According to the Court of Cassation, “the essence of civil 
responsibility is to reestablish as closely as possible the balance destroyed by 
the damage and to put the victim back in the place he or she would have been 
if the injurious act had not occurred.”47  Consequently, as Christian 
                                                                                                                   
 39 Stefan Vogenauer, The Avant-Projet de Réforme: An Overview, in REFORMING THE 
FRENCH LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 3, 3 (John Cartwright, Stefan Vogenauer & Simon Whittaker 
eds., 2009). 
 40 Avant-Projet de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la prescription, supra 
note 13, Présentation générale de l’Avant-Projet, s. 5. 
 41 Vogenauer, supra note 39, at 11. 
 42 Borghetti, supra note 8, at 69. 
 43 Vogenauer, supra note 39, at 12 (noting that the Avant-Projet increases the number of 
provisions concerning civil liability from six to sixty-four, partly because of the sparse style of 
the Civil Code’s current tort provisions and partly because it addresses both contractual and 
tort liability together). 
 44 See Avant-Projet de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la prescription, supra 
note 13, Livre Troisième, Titre III, Sous-Titre III (outlining, for example, principles for 
determining when a damage award is appropriate).  
 45 Azarnia, supra note 32, at 488; see also Viney, supra note 32, at 260 (noting that there 
must be “equivalence between harm and compensation”); Michael Faure, Tort Liability in 
France: An Introductory Economic Analysis, in LAW AND ECONOMICS IN CIVIL LAW 
COUNTRIES 169, 169 (Bruno Deffains & Thierry Kirat eds., 2001) (arguing that “although it is 
recognised that tort law can serve a variety of goals, the purpose which is mostly stressed [in 
the French legal system] is the victim compensation argument”). 
 46 Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., June 19, 2003, Bull. 
civ. II, No. 203 (holding that “the person responsible for an accident must repair all injurious 
consequences” (emphasis added)). 
 47 Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., July 9, 1981, Bull. 
civ. II, No. 156. 
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Lapoyade Deschamps notes, the French tort system requires taking into 
account “all the consequences caused by the tort to the victim’s detriment” 
and results in the victim receiving compensation for “everything or almost 
everything.”48  Not surprisingly, given this understanding of full reparation, 
both economic and non-economic harms are normally compensable.49  In 
practice, French judges have adopted a broad conception of the full 
reparation principle to ensure that victims are made whole.50 
At the same time, driven by a strong commitment to corrective justice, 
French judges have sought to reestablish the status quo and maintain parity 
between members of society through findings of liability and damage 
awards.51  From this perspective, tort law serves as an engine for restoring 
the moral balance, recognizing rights and wrongs and requiring tortfeasors 
recompense their victims as a way to reestablish this moral balance.52  
Corrective justice aims to bring about change through the reward of damages 
by achieving a just state of affairs between a tortfeasor and his or her victim 
                                                                                                                   
 48 Lapoyade Deschamps, supra note 10, at 89–90 (emphasis added) (noting that the “golden 
rule” of equivalency means that damage awards, at least in principle, do not make any sort of 
distinction between different kinds of harm); see, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme 
court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Jan. 22, 2009, Bull. civ. II, No. 26 (reaffirming that “the 
person causing an accident must repair the integrality of the injurious consequences” and 
overruling a decision of a court of appeal that refused to award the victim of an assault for the 
economic loss he suffered after being forced to sell his shares in his business at below market 
value because he was no longer able to run the business after the assault). 
 49 Yvonne Lambert-Faivre, L’indemnisation des victimes de préjudices non économiques, 
39 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT 537, 540 (1998).  According to Lambert-Faivre, the full reparation 
principle requires that the tortfeasor repair all harms suffered by the victim.  For economic 
harms, this poses no theoretical challenge.  For non-economic harms, however, the full 
reparation principle is more difficult to apply.  She notes that 
even if money doesn’t ‘repair’ anything, it is the only way to give the victim 
satisfactory compensation: it above all serves to recognize the dignity of the 
person, . . . his or her suffering, and the fact that he or she is a person, body 
and soul, with his or her own identity and indomitable individuality . . . . 
Id. 
 50 Id. See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Jan. 
22, 2009, Bull. civ. II, No. 26 (requiring a victim be compensated the full value of his shares 
after being forced to sell them at below market value because he had been assaulted and could 
no longer run the business). 
 51 See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Dec. 7, 
1978, Bull. civ. II, No. 269 (noting that damages should aim to put the victim in the place he 
or she would have been if the injurious act had never happened); see also CAROLINE LACROIX, 
LA RÉPARATION DES DOMMAGES EN CASE DE CATASTROPHES 4 (2008) (arguing that “the 
reparation society must be able to offer its members is . . . found in the need for justice and the 
affirmation of responsibility”); GOMAA, supra note 16, at 129 (arguing that tort law should 
seek to reestablish the equilibrium between members of society).  
 52 See Radin, supra note 19, at 60 (discussing tort law and corrective justice). 
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and by affirming public respect for the existence of certain rights.53  
Restoration of the moral balance through victim compensation is thus 
generally recognized, at least explicitly among most judges and academics, 
as being a main priority of tort law.54  
As a result of this commitment to victim reparation, judicial practice in 
France has been more strongly influenced by questions of social good and 
fairness, particularly when contrasted with judicial practice in other countries 
such as the United States.55  As Richard Azarnia notes, however, it would be 
erroneous to say that French tort law is “fairer” than American tort law; 
rather, French tort law is simply more likely to be directed toward restoring 
the moral balance and promoting the principle of equivalence.56  This helps 
to explain, at least in part, why French law formally rejects the notion of 
punitive damages.57 
Nevertheless, as the principle of full reparation has come under increasing 
attacks for being undercompensatory at times, some French scholars have 
posited that courts—influenced by practices in many common law 
jurisdictions such as the United States—have responded by covertly 
awarding damages based not only on the harm suffered by victims, but also 
taking into consideration the behavior of tortfeasors who deliberately violate 
their victims’ interests.58  While French law does not explicitly recognize 
                                                                                                                   
 53 Borghetti, supra note 8, at 71–72. 
 54 Id. 
 55 French scholars often frame judicial decisions in terms of the social good and fairness 
they promote.  See, e.g., FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE AU DROIT (2009) (arguing 
through a corrective justice lens that the law is a collection of rules of conduct that govern the 
relationship between people in society).  Although difficult to make comparisons without 
oversimplifying the complexities of the law, particularly given the lack of detailed studies on 
the amount of damage awards in French tort law, it is more common for French tort victims to 
receive larger damage awards when they have experienced moral suffering as opposed to only 
economic harm. See Borghetti, supra note 8, at 66–67 (attempting to explain why French 
courts may award greater damages when there is moral harm); see, e.g., Tribunaux de grande 
instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 1e ch., Jan. 16, 2008 (cited in 
Borghetti, supra note 8, at 65) (awarding €100,000 to the Ligue de protection des oiseaux 
(Bird Protection League) in order to compensate the moral harm the organization suffered as a 
result of an oil spill killing seabirds and destroying their habitat).  Nevertheless, the award of 
substantial damages for moral harms is also common in the United States.  See, e.g., Robinson 
v. Wroblewski, 704 N.E.2d 467, 472 (Ind. 1998) (awarding damages for the loss of a child’s 
love and companionship).  
 56 Azarnia, supra note 32, at 490. 
 57 See, e.g., BACACHE-GIBEILI, supra note 23, at 486 (critiquing punitive damages and 
arguing that they are inconsistent with principles of French tort law).   
 58 Borghetti, supra note 8, at 56; but see Sophie Schiller, Hypothèse de l’américanisation 
du droit de la responsabilité, 45 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 177 (2001) (arguing that 
although American law has influenced French tort law generally, French damage awards have 
not been subject to the same American influence because of procedural and sociological 
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these so-called “covert punitive damages,” these scholars have argued that 
tortfeasors may sometimes find themselves bound to pay damages exceeding 
the monetary harm they have caused.59  
Claims that French courts are awarding covert punitive damages, 
however, are difficult to assess.  Among the challenges faced in evaluating 
these claims is the fact that French judges rarely have to provide detailed 
explanations or justifications when they set damages.60  Nonetheless, one 
study found that damages awarded to compensate moral harm flowing from 
the death of a relative were on average higher when the defendant’s fault 
caused the death than in cases where it did not.61  Studies like these have led 
at least one scholar to conclude that courts may already be awarding 
damages of a punitive character—even if only covertly.62 
As the body of literature on damage awards in the French tort system 
continues to grow, a small but increasing number of French scholars have 
begun to reexamine assumptions about the underlying principles guiding the 
French tort system.63  While French tort law remains steadfast in its explicit 
commitment to victim reparation and corrective justice, some of these 
scholars have argued that this narrow conception of the purposes of tort law 
fails to fully capture implicit principles that also drive the law, such as 
punishment and deterrence.64  
                                                                                                                   
differences between the two countries). 
 59 For a full discussion of such so-called “covert punitive damages,” see Borghetti, supra 
note 8, at 56–66.  See, e.g., Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Bastia, Nov. 15, 
2006, Revue Lamy droit de l’immatériel 2006, No. 685, note L. Grynbaum (cited in Borghetti, 
supra note 8, at 66) (requiring a defendant who engaged in business practices that constituted 
unfair competition to pay damages that exceeded the harm suffered by the plaintiff and took 
into account the profits which he reaped from his culpable behavior).  For a good doctrinal 
review of punitive damages in France, see CLOTHILDE GRARE, RECHERCHES SUR LA 
COHÉRENCE DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ DÉLICTUELLE: L'INFLUENCE DES FONDEMENTS DE LA 
RESPONSABILITÉ SUR LA RÉPARATION (2005); SUZANNE CARVAL, LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE 
DANS SA FONCTION DE PEINE PRIVÉE (1995); BORIS STARCK, ESSAI D'UNE THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE DE 
LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE CONSIDÉRÉE EN SA DOUBLE FONCTION DE GARANTIE ET DE PEINE 
PRIVÉE (1947). 
 60 CARVAL, supra note 59, at 360. 
 61 Borghetti, supra note 8, at 63 (citing Martine Bourrié-Quenillet, L’indeminasation des 
proches d’une victime décédée accidentellement: Étudet d’informatique judiciaire (1983) 
(unpublished thesis, Montpellier 1)). 
 62 Id. 
 63 See, e.g., Patrice Jourdain, Rapport introductive, in FAUT-IL MORALISER LE DROIT 
FRANÇAIS DE LA RÉPARATION DU DOMMAGE? 3 (Emmanuelle Filiberti et al. eds., 2002) 
(questioning whether tort law’s purposes are too narrowly construed in the French legal 
system); CARVAL, supra note 59, at 13 (arguing that civil liability acts as a form of “peine 
privée” (private punishment), beyond simply serving a compensatory mechanism).  
 64 See sources cited supra note 63; see also MURIEL FABRE-MAGNAN, DROIT DES 
OBLIGATIONS, 2–RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE ET QUASI-CONTRATS 13 (2010) (discussing some of 
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Punitive damages are often associated with punishment and deterrence.65  
These functions are often overlooked in French tort law, however, given the 
priority for full reparation to restore the moral balance.66  Nevertheless, while 
often characterized as serving their own distinct functions, punishment and 
deterrence are not necessarily inconsistent with the principles of victim 
compensation and the reestablishment of parity between members of society.  
This is particularly true, for example, in cases where tortfeasors know that 
their voluntary violation of a legal rule will subject them to less liability than 
the profit they stand to gain if regular compensatory damages are low.67  In 
such cases, the prospect of punitive damages and the potential of being held 
liable for a greater damage award act to deter such behavior, helping to 
maintain the moral balance.68  Similarly, where a tortfeasor nonetheless 
chooses to commit the tort, the retributive effect of punitive damages can 
provide more just compensation for damages that escape accountability as 
well as better recognize rights and wrongs, bringing about a more just state 
of affairs.69  In light of these considerations, some French scholars have 
suggested that deterrence and retribution may already be operating covertly 
in French tort law, not only as independent functions for tort liability, but 
also as mechanisms supporting the more explicit French tort functions of full 
reparation and the return to a more just state of affairs.70  
                                                                                                                   
the principles underlying French tort law). 
 65 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). 
 66 See, e.g., Daniel Fasquelle & Rodolphe Mesa, Les fautes lucratives et les assurances de 
dommages, 10 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DU DROIT DES ASSURANCES 351, 360 (2005) (discussing moral 
balance in the context of torts where the tortfeasor profits even after compensating the victim). 
 67 Borghetti, supra note 8, at 68. 
 68 See, e.g., Suzanne Carval, Vers l’introduction en droit français de dommages-intérêts 
punitifs?, 1 REVUE DES CONTRATS 822, 826 (2006) (arguing that punitive damages are 
especially apt in cases where the tortfeasor may profit because compensatory damages are 
low). 
 69 See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 
39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1662–63 (1992) (stating that the purpose of retributive justice is “to 
right the wrong”); see also Jourdain, supra note 63, at 3 (discussing the role of morality in 
damage awards). 
 70 See Carval, supra note 68, at 822 (noting that despite the insistence of the full reparation 
principle, in setting damages, French courts may covertly go beyond simply looking at the 
harm suffered by the victim, taking into account the culpable behavior of the tortfeasors and 
awarding damages of a retributive and deterrence dimension); see, e.g., Cour de cassation 
[Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Nov. 5, 1996, Bull. civ. I, No. 378 (holding 
that the mere infringement of the right to privacy entitles the victim to compensation, even if 
he or she has suffered no monetary harm); see also Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court 
for judicial matters] com., Jun. 16, 1992, Bull. civ. IV, No. 241 (upholding a decision 
requiring a restaurant company pay ₣800,000 to a restaurant owner for copying the name of 
his restaurant, arguably as a way to both punish the company and help restore the disrupted 
moral balance). 
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Although there is little doubt the drafters of the Avant-Projet recognized 
this emerging debate about the proper functions of tort law, they remained 
steadfastly committed to the explicit French goal of equivalency between 
harm and compensation.  The Avant-Projet, like the Civil Code, thus begins 
by affirming the full reparation principle.71  This is immediately followed, 
however, by an exception to the equivalency principle allowing for payment 
of punitive damages under certain circumstances: 
A person who commits a manifestly deliberate fault, and 
notably a fault with a view to gain, can be condemned in 
addition to compensatory damages to pay punitive damages, 
part of which the judge may in his or her discretion allocate to 
the Public Treasury.  A judge’s decision to order payment of 
damages of this kind must be supported with specific reasons 
and their amount distinguished from any other damages 
awarded to the victim.  Punitive damages may not be the object 
of insurance.72 
The Avant-Projet’s proposal thus draws a clear link between punitive 
damages and fault, especially fault with a view to gain.  Moreover, unlike 
most other forms of damages in France,73 punitive damages are to be 
uninsurable, forbidding tortfeasors from simply passing on this penalty to 
their insurer.74  In a further break from the French tradition of judges not 
customarily providing explanation for their damage awards,75 the Avant-
Projet would require judges to give a reasoned opinion explaining why 
punitive damages are being imposed and distinguishing them from other 
damages awarded to the victim.76 
Long guided by an explicit commitment to the principle of full reparation, 
the official recognition of punitive damages arguably represents a significant 
departure from current French practice.  Many French scholars and 
                                                                                                                   
 71 Avant-Projet de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la prescription, supra 
note 13, art. 1370 states:  
Subject to special regulation or agreement to the contrary, the aim of an 
award of damages is to put the victim as far as possible in the position in 
which he or she would have been if the harmful circumstances had not taken 
place.  He or she must neither gain nor lose from it. 
 72 Id. art. 1371. 
 73 Viney, supra note 32, at 238. 
 74 Borghetti, supra note 8, at 70; Corbé-Chalon & Ragoff, supra note 15, at 295. 
 75 Borghetti, supra note 8, at 62. 
 76 Avant-Projet de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la prescription, supra 
note 13, art. 1371. 
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politicians contend that the principle of full reparation, with its requirements 
of equivalence and adequacy, should prohibit the award of such damages 
because they often unjustly enrich the victim and disrupt the moral balance.77  
Given this tradition and the exceptional nature of punitive damages, their 
inclusion in the Avant-Projet begs the question of what led the drafters to 
propose their recognition in French tort law.  In these circumstances, insight 
into the rationales underlying punitive damages and the objections most 
often raised to their application may be gained by placing the French 
experience in a comparative perspective. 
III.  A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: THE JUSTIFICATIONS AND CRITIQUES 
A.  Background: Understanding the Rationales for Punitive Damages and 
Juxtaposing the French and American Experiences 
Although punitive damages are well-entrenched in most common law 
legal systems, they play a much smaller role in the civil law tradition.78  
Comparisons between the ways different legal systems address substantive 
policy issues like punitive damages are helpful not only for understanding 
how legal norms are created, but also for identifying alternative and 
sometimes better ways for dealing with difficult policy questions.79  When 
viewing different legal systems, however, it is important to remember that 
few are so diametrically opposed that they face each other from completely 
opposing black and white sides; rather, it is better to conceptualize divergent 
policy choices as different shades of grey on a spectrum of possibilities.80  
One of these grey areas of the law is the issue of punitive damages.  
Tracing its origins to eighteenth century England,81 the modern doctrine of 
punitive damages has been both embraced and attacked by judges, lawyers, 
legislators and academics alike.82  A closer examination of the rationales and 
                                                                                                                   
 77 See, e.g., Anziani & Bétaille, supra note 15, III. C. Les dommages et intérêts punitifs: 
une innovation pertinente pour certains contentieux de la responsabilité (“The jurisprudence 
thus attributes a simple reparative function to civil responsibility—sometimes said to be 
‘compensatory,’ ‘restorative’ or ‘satisfactory’—and disavows a private punishment 
function.”). 
 78 Wells, supra note 7, at 557; Koziol, supra note 8, at 748. 
 79 See, e.g., KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOETZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
15 (Tony Weir trans., 1977) (noting that comparative lawyers often propose that their own 
legal system adopt a solution to a particular problem which has been adopted in a different 
legal system). 
 80 Koziol, supra note 8, at 742. 
 81 For a good overview of the history of punitive damages, see David Partlett, Punitive 
Damages: Legal Hot Zones, 56 LA. L. REV. 781, 784–85 (1996). 
 82 Sir Henry Brook, A Brief Introduction: The Origins of Punitive Damages, in PUNITIVE 
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critiques for punitive damages, with a particular focus on the debates that 
have unfolded in the United States, helps to inform the possible reasons why 
the Avant-Projet’s drafters proposed the French legal system officially 
recognize punitive damages for the first time. 
The conventional view is that punitive damages serve both retributive and 
deterrent goals.83  Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that punitive damages’ 
origins lie in English common law where the concept of “exemplary 
damages” developed in part as a way for juries to express their outrage at 
tortfeasors’ conduct84 and recognize the loss of dignity suffered by tort 
victims.85  As Martin Redish and Andrew Mathews explain, English courts 
began awarding exemplary damages in cases where plaintiffs established that 
they had experienced some sort of dignitary harm that remained otherwise 
uncompensated.86  Through a series of cases involving abuses of power by 
English governmental officials in the 1760s,87 exemplary damages emerged 
as a doctrine not only to compensate victims more fully and to punish and 
deter malicious conduct, but also to vindicate the public interest in the 
respect of its laws and recognize the dignitary harm the victim had 
suffered.88  
Early American tort law followed the English example,89 gradually 
referring to exemplary damages as punitive damages to emphasize the goal 
of penalizing tortfeasors for their wrongdoing.90  Today in the United States, 
punitive damages are defined as “damages, other than compensatory or 
nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous 
conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the 
future.”91  There is no shortage of literature on the retributive and deterrent 
purposes of punitive damages by scholars in the country.92 
                                                                                                                   
DAMAGES: COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW PERSPECTIVES, supra note 8, at 1, 2. 
 83 Sunstein et al., supra note 22, at 2075. 
 84 A. (T.W.N.) v. Clarke, [2004] 22 B.C.L.R. 4th 1 (Can.) (discussing the origins of 
punitive damages in English common law). 
 85 Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages are Unconstitutional, 
53 EMORY L.J. 1, 14 (2004). 
 86 Id. 
 87 The earliest cases were Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.) and Huckle v. 
Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P.). 
 88 See Vidmar & Wolfe, supra note 20, at 181–82 (describing the origins and development 
of exemplary damages). 
 89 See Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. 6, 7 (S.C. 1784) (holding that a doctor who deliberately 
poisoned the drink of an adversary was liable for “exemplary damages” to the victim). 
 90 Vidmar & Wolfe, supra note 20, at 181–82. 
 91 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977) (emphasis added). 
 92 See, e.g., Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Saving Lives Through Punitive Damages, 83 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 229, 238–42 (2010) (arguing that punitive damages can be used to deter 
wrongful deaths); Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The 
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Some scholars, however, have begun to question whether the focus on 
retribution and deterrence is warranted.93  Margaret Jane Radin, for example, 
argues that punitive damages serve as a way to provide redress for the victim 
while forcing the wrongdoer to recognize that what he or she did was 
wrong.94  Because redress is not necessarily about monetary restitution but 
rather affirming public recognition of certain rights and wrongs, Radin 
argues that there is a certain incommensurability between the harm caused by 
a tort and the corresponding damage award.95  Drawing in part on Radin’s 
analysis, David Owen similarly contends that the purpose of punitive 
damages is not simply to punish or deter.96  He suggests that punitive 
damages help to “restore” victims and “redress” wrongs.97  
The Supreme Court of the United States, at least implicitly, also seems to 
have endorsed a view that punitive damages can serve a redressive function.  
For example, although the Court in BMW of North America v. Gore 
purported to adopt deterrent and punishment rationales in its decision to 
award punitive damages and made no explicit mention of tort law’s 
redressive function,98 its three “guideposts” for assessing the constitutionality 
of a punitive damages award—the degree of reprehensibility of the 
tortfeasor’s conduct, the ratio between the award and the harm inflicted on 
the victim, and the civil and criminal sanctions for comparable 
misconduct99—suggest that redress may have been a motivating factor.  If 
Radin is correct that redress seeks to “symbolize public respect for the 
                                                                                                                   
Past, Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 421–67 (2007) 
(suggesting that punitive damages are properly conceived of as a form of punishment for 
private wrongs). 
 93 See, e.g., David G. Owen, Aggravating Punitive Damages, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 181, 182 
(2010) (arguing that punitive damages “offer[] victims of aggravated wrongdoing robust 
redress for the panoply of losses aggravated by the flagrancy of a wrong”); John Goldberg, 
The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of 
Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 530 (2005) (stating that “notwithstanding the dominant tendency 
among modern scholars to treat tort law as an instrument for attaining public goals such as 
loss-spreading or efficient precaution-taking, it is still best understood as a law of redress”); 
Catherine Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 351–
52 (2003) (noting that “punitive damages have been used to pursue not only the goals of 
retribution and deterrence, but also to accomplish, however crudely, a societal compensation 
goal: the redress of harms caused by defendants who injure persons beyond the individual 
plaintiffs in a particular case”); Radin, supra note 19, at 61 (suggesting that a focus on redress 
provides a more useful framework for understanding punitive damages). 
 94 Radin, supra note 19, at 85. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Owen, supra note 93, at 192. 
 97 Id. at 192–93. 
 98 BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996). 
 99 Id. at 574–85. 
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existence of certain rights and public recognition of the transgressor’s fault in 
disrespecting those rights,”100 the Court’s focus on the degree of 
reprehensibility in particular is strong evidence that redress is at least 
implicitly guiding the Court’s decision and its understanding of punitive 
damages. 
Thus, it is interesting to juxtapose the American and French approaches to 
punitive damages.  While the American tort system explicitly embraces 
principles of retribution and deterrence in its award of damages,101 
motivations of social redress also seem to be operating as a background 
principle.102  In contrast, as previously discussed, the French tort system, 
with its strong and explicit commitment to full reparation and moral balance, 
draws significantly on principles of social redress,103 but arguably embraces 
principles of retribution and deterrence implicitly in some cases as well.104  
In this section of the Article, I examine more closely these rationales as 
they apply to punitive damages in the French tort system.  More specifically, 
I show that punitive damages are consistent with the principle of social 
redress, both as a way to vindicate victims’ rights and to express the 
community’s and legal system’s disapproval of the tortfeasor’s misconduct.  
They also serve important retributive and deterrent functions, which some 
scholars have dismissed as incompatible with the principles of the French 
tort system, but I suggest are not necessarily so. 
B. Social Redress: Vindication of Victims’ Rights 
Punitive damages are a valuable weapon where social policy is frustrated, 
providing vindication for the victim by recognizing that his or her rights have 
been violated.  John Goldberg, for example, has argued that “tort law is a law 
for the redress of private wrongs . . ., empower[ing] a victim to seek redress 
from a wrongdoer because that other has acted wrongfully toward 
him . . . .”105  Accordingly, punitive damages can be understood in one sense 
as a sort of damage payment for victims who have suffered particularly 
egregious wrongs, triggering an entitlement to redress that would not be 
                                                                                                                   
 100 Radin, supra note 19, at 61. 
 101 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979); Sunstein et al., supra note 22, at 
2074. 
 102 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 103 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 104 See, e.g., Borghetti, supra note 8, at 68; see also Fasquelle & Mesa, supra note 66, at 360 
(arguing that requiring tortfeasors to pay damages amounting to the profit they make, and not 
just the loss they cause, can serve to deter certain tortious behavior). 
 105 Goldberg, supra note 93, at 599. 
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otherwise fulfilled.106  While Goldberg notes that “making whole” may not 
always be the appropriate measure of redress, he acknowledges that in many 
cases it is.107  Other scholars, too, have noted that the recognition of punitive 
damages’ redressive function can help to meet the goal of providing full 
compensation to victims.108  Under this view, compensation moves beyond 
the market rhetoric, focusing more on core concepts of rights and wrongs.109  
As a result, requiring tortfeasors to pay damages to their victims does more 
than simply compensate the victim for the monetary “costs” he or she has 
suffered, but also forces the tortfeasor to recognize that he or she has 
committed a wrong and consequently must make redress to the victim.110 
Punitive damages can thus serve an important redressive function by 
affirming the rights of the victim and recognizing the difficulty and 
incommensurability of equating harm with money.111  This is particularly 
true in the French context where, as previously discussed, courts have 
rejected a narrow and formalistic understanding of the full reparation 
principle and instead embraced the notion that all damages should be 
compensated.112  Tort actions are grounded on the legal conclusion that a 
tortfeasor has breached a civil duty, and the remedy for the resulting tortious 
loss is compensation through damages.113  The circumstances of the tort, 
however, may be such that regular damages do not adequately compensate 
the victim for his or her actual loss.114  Moreover, torts often result in 
intangible losses that escape easy accounting.115  Punitive damages may 
                                                                                                                   
 106 Id. at 604. 
 107 Id. at 604–05. 
 108 See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501, 1574 (2009) (stating that redress “is not simply monetary 
compensation to make the victim ‘whole,’ but the right to have the ‘wrong’ acknowledged 
and, if the victim chooses, to seek an appropriate amount of damages to act as satisfaction”). 
 109 Radin, supra note 19, at 60. 
 110 Id. at 61. 
 111 Id. at 56, 60–61. 
 112 See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., June 19, 
2003, Bull. civ. II, No. 203 (holding that the person responsible for an accident must repair all 
injurious consequences). 
 113 Anthony Sebok, Punitive Damages in the United States, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: COMMON 
LAW AND CIVIL LAW PERSPECTIVES 155, 169 (Helmut Koziol & Vanessa Wilcox eds., 2009). 
 114 Partlett, supra note 81, at 793.  For example, tort victims in countries like the United 
States and, as will be discussed later, France, generally have to pay their own legal fees and 
often face significant costs in bringing their claims.  As the court notes in Kemezy v. Peters, 
79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996), punitive damages can incentivize victims to bring tort claims 
(relieving the burden on the criminal justice system) by helping to shoulder the costs of 
enforcement. 
 115 See generally Richard Wise, Quantification of Economic Damages 10–12 (Faculty of 
Law, McGill University, Working Paper, 1996) (categorizing tortious conduct and losses, and 
explaining how damages are calculated), available at http://www.wiseblackman.com/english/ 
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potentially fill this void by providing a more nuanced approach which better 
supports the rights of the victim and ensures that he or she receives adequate 
compensation for losses incurred.116 
Vindication of victims’ rights underscored many of the decisions in early 
English cases involving so-called “exemplary damages.”  English courts 
began awarding exemplary damages in cases where victims established that 
they had suffered a dignitary harm that was difficult to quantify monetarily 
and thus risked going uncompensated.117  This same sort of private redress 
rationale similarly underscored many early United States Supreme Court 
decisions, such as Day v. Woodworth, decided by the Court in 1851.118  In 
Day, although there was no colorable claim for personal injury, the Court 
imposed punitive damages where “the wrong done to the plaintiff [was] 
incapable of being measured by a money standard,” but nonetheless 
warranted recognition.119  
More recent United States Supreme Court decisions, however, have 
tended to de-emphasize—at least formally—the redressive function of tort 
law, instead focusing on its deterrent and retributive dimensions.120  
Nonetheless, some scholars have suggested that the principle of redress may 
still be guiding the Court.121  Jessica Berch, for example, notes that American 
                                                                                                                   
pdf/Article15.pdf. 
 116 Id. 
 117 See, e.g., Huckle v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P.) (awarding exemplary 
damages where government officials entered the plaintiff’s home with a nameless warrant in 
an attempt to procure evidence, and calling the action “worse than the Spanish Inquisition” 
and “a most daring public attack . . . upon the liberty of [an Englishman]”). 
 118 Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363 (1851). 
 119 Sebok, supra note 113, at 174 (discussing and quoting Day, 54 U.S. at 363). 
 120 See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams ex rel. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 359 (2007) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “a punitive damages award, instead of serving a 
compensatory purpose, serves the entirely different purposes of retribution and deterrence”); 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (noting that punitive 
damages “are aimed at deterrence and retribution”); Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 
532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (noting that punitive damages are “intended to punish the defendant 
and to deter future wrongdoing”). 
 121 See, e.g., Jessica Berch, The Need for Enforcement of U.S. Punitive Damages Awards by 
the European Union, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 55, 75–76 (2010) (noting that some states have 
adopted multiplier statutes as a way to strike a balance between giving juries unfettered 
discretion and allowing for damages that will deter “certain aberrant antisocial conduct”); Dan 
Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1394–95 (2009) 
(suggesting that punitive damages can serve as a mechanism to “vindicate a victim’s dignity 
and autonomy interests”); Mark Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, Retribution, and Due Process, 
81 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 269–74 (2008) (acknowledging that allowing plaintiffs a right to seek 
“stylized revenge” functions in a way that permits victims to assert their equal moral worth); 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, 106 (2005) 
(arguing that punitive damages are intended not only to punish a tortfeasor, but to recognize 
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punitive damages are perhaps taking on an increasingly moral character to 
redress particularly offensive conduct.122  Similarly, Mark Geistfel argues 
that recent Supreme Court decisions, like Philip Morris USA v. Williams,123 
are consistent with the view that punitive damages can serve as a form of 
individual victim vindication.124  For example, in BMW of North America v. 
Gore, the Court purported to adopt deterrence and retribution as rationales in 
awarding punitive damages.125  Nonetheless, the decision arguably also 
endorsed a redressive rationale, as reflected, for example, in its inclusion of 
the degree of reprehensibility of the tortfeasor’s conduct in assessing the 
amount of the punitive damage award.126  Principles of social redress, with 
their focus on affirming victims’ rights and their recognition that monetary 
compensation cannot necessarily always equate damages with harm, thus 
seem to be implicitly influencing the Court.  
Critics of punitive damages, however, charge that the rationale that 
punitive damages vindicate personal rights undermines social policy.  
Among the critiques leveled by opponents is that punitive damages lead to 
overcompensation.127  Drawing on cases like Philip Morris USA, critics 
suggest that overcompensation undermines the rights-based rationale for 
punitive damages and conflates tort law and criminal law.128  This is 
especially problematic in countries such as France where the purpose behind 
damage awards is restoring the moral balance because the victim receives the 
                                                                                                                   
that a victim “has a right to be punitive”). 
 122 Berch, supra note 121, at 75 n.102. 
 123 Philip Morris USA, 549 U.S. at 346. 
 124 Geistfeld, supra note 121, at 284–92 (using the Philip Morris USA case to illustrate how 
punishment is equated into monetary damages and how the vindictive nature of such awards 
may be subject to judicial review). 
 125 BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996). 
 126 Id. 
 127 See, e.g., Koziol, supra note 8, at 761–62 (questioning whether punitive damages are 
necessary to compensate for emotional or immaterial loss); Luke Ledbetter, “It’s the [Tort 
System], Stupid”: Consumer Deductibles: How to More Equitably Distribute the Risks of 
Medical Malpractice and Adequately Compensate Victims Without Statutory Damages Caps, 
6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 51, 54 (2006) (arguing that the American tort system overcompensates 
plaintiffs with minimal injuries, but undercompensates those with catastrophic injuries); 
Robert Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 96 (1982) 
(arguing that “when punitive damages are awarded in addition to compensatory damages, 
victims are usually overcompensated”). 
 128 Koziol, supra note 32, at 751–59.  In Philip Morris USA, 549 U.S. at 349, the Supreme 
Court held that punitive damages were awarded based in part on the jury’s desire to punish a 
defendant for harming nonparties to the lawsuit violated due process.  On remand, the Oregon 
Supreme Court in Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 176 P.3d 1255, 1257–58 (Or. 2008), upheld 
the constitutionality of a $79.5 million punitive damages award to the widow of a man who 
died of lung cancer after smoking as many as three packs of cigarettes each day believing 
media representations that the dangers of smoking were overstated. 
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windfall from the judgment,129 violating fundamental principles of private 
law.130  Similarly, critics also question whether a more expansive and 
sensitive understanding of extra-patrimonial damages (such as emotional 
distress or pain and suffering) would be a better approach for vindicating 
personal rights than embracing punitive damages.131 
While persuasive, these critiques do not undercut the potential 
compatibility between punitive damages and the French tort system.  The idea 
that damages should vindicate personal rights is in fact strongly consistent with 
the principles underlying French tort law.  The vindication of personal rights 
promotes corrective justice by helping to restore the moral balance and by 
recognizing that the rights of victims may not be fully acknowledged through 
traditional damage awards.  Punitive damages may in fact help tort law to meet 
its goals of providing full reparation132 and of restoring the social 
equilibrium.133  Because of the incommensurability between harm and 
monetary damages, and the difficulty of accounting for both the tangible and 
intangible losses,134 victims in tort actions are often grossly undercompensated, 
undermining the corrective justice rationale in French tort law.135  As Judge 
Richard Posner notes, victim undercompensation is especially likely in cases 
where the injury is of an elusive or intangible character.136  
Undercompensating victims in a case where the injury suffered is difficult to 
quantify clearly violates the full reparation principle. 
Even if damages are easily quantifiable, however, the goal of full 
reparation is often undermined.  For example, French tort victims are 
generally barred from recovering attorneys’ fees.137  This means that, in 
                                                                                                                   
 129 Several American states require victims pay a portion of their punitive damages to the 
state. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (2010); IND. CODE § 34-51-3-6(c) (2007); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735(1) (2011). 
 130 Koziol, supra note 8, at 762; James Sales & Kenneth Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A 
Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1165 (1984). 
 131 See, e.g., Erica Shultz, Note, Ignoring Distress Signals: Why Courts Should Recognize 
Emotional Distress Damages in Wrongful Adoption Claims, 52 FLA. L. REV. 1073, 1096–99 
(2000) (arguing that juries in wrongful adoption cases may resort to punitive damage awards 
because they have no other effective mechanism to compensate a victim’s emotional suffering 
and instead advocating for a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of emotional 
distress). 
 132 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 133 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 134 Sebok, supra note 113, at 172–76. 
 135 See Richard Abel, Big Lies and Small Steps: A Critique of Deborah Rhode’s Too Much 
Law, Too Little Justice: Too Much Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
1019, 1023 (1998) (noting that reputable studies all show “gross underclaiming and gross 
undercompensation of the largest claims”). 
 136 Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 137 Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Jul. 8, 2004, Bull. 
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practice, damage awards are reduced by fees the victim owes to his or her 
attorney.  This leads to undercompensation, a violation of the full reparation 
principle.   
Critics conversely argue that the gross overcompensation likely to result 
from the recognition of punitive damages threatens to instead further upset 
the moral balance.138  This concern should be tempered in the French 
context, however, where the French Court of Cassation is known for 
overturning or refusing to enforce judgments where judges clearly depart 
from the principles governing French tort law.139  For example, the Court of 
Cassation frequently sets aside judgments purporting to award damages “in 
equity” or of a purely symbolic amount when lower courts do not provide 
sufficient justification for the award.140  By requiring judges to give an 
accounting of and reasons for the punitive damages they award, the Avant-
Projet provides a further safeguard against excessive compensation while 
better ensuring that tort victims are fully compensated for their losses than 
under the current French tort system.  The proposal to recognize punitive 
damages in French tort law thus offers courts another avenue to achieve full 
reparation for victims, while providing mechanisms to regulate the awards in 
a manner that does not upset the equitable balance. 
Beyond simply closing the compensation gap, punitive damages can also 
simultaneously support the corrective justice thrust in French tort law by 
precipitating a change required to correct the unjustified state of affairs 
                                                                                                                   
civ. II, No. 365 (denying recovery of attorneys’ fees); see François-Xavier Licari, Les frais 
d’avocat comme dommage réparable – quelques réflexions sur le concours d’actions entre les 
mêmes parties et sur la relativité aquilienne à la lumière du droit comparé et de l’économie 
du droit, 31 REVUE LAMY DROIT CIVIL 66 (2006) (arguing that recovery of attorneys’ fees 
could be consistent with the full reparation principle).  
 138 See generally Koziol, supra note 8, at 757 (noting that punitive damages—as far as 
compensation for a loss suffered by the victim is concerned—must fit into the whole system 
of compensation under tort law which, at least until recently, was not the case in the United 
States). 
 139 Viney, supra note 32, at 261.  More specifically, the Court will set aside judgments that 
have not followed the full reparation principle or that have set an amount of damages with the 
intention of punishing the tortfeasor.  See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for 
judicial matters] 2e civ., Nov. 28, 1962, Bull. civ. II, No. 756 (overturning a lower court 
verdict awarding ₣3,000 for the moral harm stemming from the death of the plaintiff’s 
husband and stating that “moral harm lends itself poorly to pecuniary compensation which, to 
be just, can only be of principle”); but see Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial 
matters] ch. mixte, Sept. 6, 2002, Mix. bull., No. 4 (noting that a court of appeal has sovereign 
power to set the amount of a damage award so long as it is justified by the court’s evaluation, 
“without having to specify its constitutive elements”). 
 140 Viney, supra note 32, at 261; see, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for 
judicial matters] crim., Jan. 15, 1997, Bull. crim., No. 11 (overturning a lower court verdict 
awarding a “quasi-symbolic” sum of ₣10,000 to the plaintiff for the loss of the pleasure of the 
view from his villa after the defendants constructed an edifice without the proper permit). 
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between the tortfeasor and his or her victim caused by the tort.141  Punitive 
damages can bring about a just state of affairs by encouraging a return to the 
status quo ante through the recognition of the harm and compensation to the 
victim.142  Given French tort law’s broad corrective justice-oriented goal of 
reestablishing parity between members of society through damage awards,143 
punitive damages offer yet another tool for achieving this objective.   
Punitive damages are also a better alternative to either the increasing 
reliance on the French judiciary’s covert increase of damage awards in cases 
where the moral balance has been disrupted or to the adoption of a more 
expansive understanding of extra-patrimonial damages.  By explicitly 
adopting punitive damages as a tool for achieving the objectives of the 
French tort system, judges would be better positioned to develop a more 
coherent framework for filling gaps in the existing tort system without 
creating unnecessary confusion about the proper role of extra-patrimonial 
damages such as emotional distress or pain and suffering in the tort system.  
As Thomas Colby notes, “[p]unitive damages vindicate the dignity of an 
individual victim by allowing her to punish the defendant for committing a 
humiliating or insulting tort upon her.”144  This allows the victim “to equalize 
her moral status with that of her aggressor.”145  Given their redressive 
functions, punitive damages offer a robust method for restoring the moral 
balance and closing the compensation gap, consistent with principles 
underlying French tort law. 
C.  Social Redress: Vindication of Society’s Rights 
As a corollary to the redressive functions that punitive damages play in 
the personal realm, punitive damages are also awarded to vindicate the insult 
to society that the tortfeasor committed through his or her tortious conduct.  
A sort of “hybrid between a display of ethical indignation and the imposition 
of a criminal fine,”146 punitive damages are recognized as not only 
vindicating private wrongs, but also public rights.147  Because the tortfeasor 
has acted in a way that is inconsistent with the laws that govern society and 
                                                                                                                   
 141 Radin, supra note 19, at 60. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See LACROIX, supra note 51, at 4–5 (suggesting that “justice” and the “affirmation of 
responsibility” motivate the approach to damages taken in French tort law). 
 144 Colby, supra note 92, at 434. 
 145 Id. at 442. 
 146 Haines v. Schultz, 14 A. 488, 484–85 (N.J. 1888). 
 147 E.g., Hammerly Oaks, Inc. v. Edwards, 958 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1997); Condict v. Hewitt, 
369 P.2d 278, 280 (Wyo. 1962); Trudeau v. Cooke, 769 N.Y.S.2d 322, 322 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2003).  
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has consequently harmed another person, “the injury partakes more or less of 
a public character, and extends beyond the mere pecuniary damage sustained 
by the party against whom it has been committed.”148  In response, punitive 
damages may serve to vindicate public rights and frame a community 
norm.149  Moreover, they may help to maintain social harmony by providing 
a judicial remedy for the vindication of social violations instead of the 
violent self-help to which victims might otherwise resort if their complaints 
to criminal justice authorities are ignored and no other legal remedies are 
available.150  By vindicating the public interest in the respect of its laws, 
punitive damages offer a valuable tool for addressing social harms and 
frustrated social policy. 
Social redress through vindication of public rights is thus closely aligned 
with notions of corrective justice.  As Radin notes, compensation is a 
“contested concept.”151  While commodified conceptions of compensation 
may restore a victim financially by equating harm to the individual victim 
with a money value, “such conceptions do not necessarily restore moral 
balance.”152  Rather, a noncommodified conception of compensation, where 
harm and money are not easily commensurable, provides a more useful 
framework for assessing damages.153  From this point of view, redress, as 
expressed through a payment from the tortfeasor to the victim, not only 
makes up for certain social disadvantages the tortfeasor has caused, but 
serves to symbolize public respect for the existence of certain rights, thereby 
vindicating the public interest.154  As Posner has suggested, punitive damages 
express “the community’s abhorrence” of the tortfeasor’s act.155  
Although the Supreme Court in State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance v. 
Campbell purports to reject the idea that punitive damages should be used to 
compensate for harms to society more generally,156 Catherine Sharkey argues 
                                                                                                                   
 148 Anthony J. Sebok, Private Law, Punishment and Disgorgement: What Did Punitive 
Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the History of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 201 (2003) (discussing Turner v. North Beach & Mission R.R. Co., 
34 Cal. 594 (1868)). 
 149 Id. at 203; see also Sharkey, supra note 93, at 359 (discussing the normative power of 
punitive damages to redress and compensate for societal harms). 
 150 Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 151 Radin, supra note 19, at 56. 
 152 Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 
1137 (2000). 
 153 Radin, supra note 19, at 56. 
 154 See id. at 61–62 (describing the tort system as one aspect of a social insurance regime in 
which society makes payments to those in need). 
 155 Kemezy, 79 F.3d at 35. 
 156 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (stating that 
compensatory damages “are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2013  9:53 AM 
2013] PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN FRANCE 413 
 
 
that a more nuanced reading of the decision suggests that the Court is not 
necessarily opposed to awarding damages for harms to people other than the 
individual plaintiffs before the Court.157  For example, in determining the 
degree of reprehensibility of State Farm’s conduct, the Court assessed 
whether the company engaged in repeated misconduct against others of the 
sort that injured the plaintiffs.158  Although the Court ultimately concluded 
that there was insufficient evidence to establish that State Farm had harmed 
others,159 the fact that it nonetheless considered State Farm’s conduct 
towards others suggests that it might take into account the harm to victims 
other than the individually named plaintiff in assessing damage awards in 
some cases.160  As Colby notes, punitive damages can provide a form of 
social redress for society more broadly, “vindicating society’s collective 
interest in restoring and reinforcing the social order.”161 
Nevertheless, critics are concerned about placing tort law beyond the 
market rhetoric and using it as an avenue for redress of transgressions against 
society more generally.162  The Court of Cassation has consistently held that 
civil liability should not have a penal function.163  Because punitive damages 
serve as a form of criminal-like sanction, critics maintain that they should be 
abandoned, and proper recourse for the vindication of public rights should be 
in a criminal court.164  For example, Jeffrey Grass argues that without 
recourse to the procedural safeguards afforded by the criminal process, 
                                                                                                                   
by reason of the defendant’s wrongful conduct” while punitive damages “are aimed at 
deterrence and retribution” (internal citations omitted)). 
 157 Sharkey, supra note 93, at 390. 
 158 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 538 U.S. at 424. 
 159 Id. 
 160 See Sharkey, supra note 93, at 391 (noting that “the concept of societal damages expands 
the boundaries of a single lawsuit’s ability to achieve the tort system’s varied goals by 
allowing a jury to assess damages against a defendant whose conduct has had harmful effects 
radiating far beyond the particular plaintiff who has initiated suit”). 
 161 Colby, supra note 92, at 437. 
 162 See generally Dan Quayle, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Tenth 
Anniversary Commemorative Issue: Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559, 565 (1992) 
(noting that, because punitive damages have taken on a quasi-criminal character, limitations 
are needed to restrict the measure of punitive damages). 
 163 See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Feb. 8, 
1977, Bull. crim., No. 52 (recognizing that in the allocation of a damages award, a civil court 
may only compensate a party for the damages caused directly to him or her).    
 164 See Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as 
Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 602 (2003) (discussing 
Edward C. Eliot, Exemplary Damages, 29 AM. L. REG. 570, 571 (1881), which argues that 
“the mingling of the criminal principles with the civil, which the doctrine necessitates, is 
altogether wrong”); see also Richard Adelstein, Victims as Cost Bearers, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 131, 160 (1999) (stating that a tort judgment “endows the civil wrong with many of the 
attributes of a crime”). 
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tortfeasors are subject to a sort of anomalous, privately-enforced form of 
criminal law in the civil tort law context.165  As Owen notes, given the lower 
burden of proof and the possibility of multiple lawsuits with punitive damage 
awards from a single tort incident with multiple victims, the civil context 
may be ill-equipped as a forum to provide social redress for the vindication 
of social rights.166  Instead, punitive damages increase the possibility of 
further upsetting the moral balance by over-penalizing tortfeasors for their 
wrongdoing.167 
Despite these criticisms, awarding punitive damages to vindicate the 
public’s interest in the respect of its laws is consistent with French tort law.  
Supporters of punitive damages have attacked the assumption that tort law’s 
focus on victim reparation necessarily means tort law cannot also 
“participate in the normative work of [the French] legal system.”168  Tort 
law, by its very nature, has the aptitude to define rules of behavior and 
sanction those who transgress them.169  As former American Supreme Court 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote, punitive damages are a “powerful 
weapon”—when imposed wisely, they can advance legitimate public 
interests.170  
From the perspective of providing redress for the vindication of public 
rights, punitive damages have the potential to advance the French 
commitment to corrective justice.  Corrective justice requires restoring the 
equilibrium between members of society.171  While critics of the introduction 
of punitive damages into the French tort law argue that punitive damages 
would frustrate the system’s goal of maintenance of parity between members 
of society by prospering one person at the expense of another,172 this 
argument relies on the erroneous assumption that, absent the reward of 
punitive damages, society is already at equilibrium.  In cases where this is 
not true, punitive damages serve as a way for society to express its outrage 
                                                                                                                   
 165 Jeffrey Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Damages, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
241, 242 (1985). 
 166 David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems, and Reform, 39 
VILL. L. REV. 363, 382–83 (1994); see also Sebok, supra note 113, at 174–75 (stating that 
under the theory that punitive damages vindicate public rights, the damages take on a “quasi 
criminal form”). 
 167 See generally Vidmar & Wolfe, supra note 20, at 192 (noting that punitive damages are 
most likely to be awarded in cases where the harm or potential harm is very serious or the 
tortfeasor’s behavior is reprehensible). 
 168 CARVAL, supra note 59, at 13. 
 169 Id. at 13–16.  Carval argues that the “hegemonic hold” of fault and reparation in the 
French tort system needs to be reevaluated in light of the moral roots of the discipline. 
 170 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 171 GOMAA, supra note 16, at 129. 
 172 Azarnia, supra note 32, at 489. 
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and mark its disapproval of the tortfeasor’s tortious conduct.173  Moreover, 
by allowing judges to allocate a portion of any punitive damage award to the 
Public Treasury, the Avant-Projet’s proposal both aims to ensure the victim 
is not overcompensated and that society receives a form of redress for the 
more general harm committed against it.  The award of punitive damages 
thus helps to restore the moral balance while reinforcing public norms 
against insults to society.  
Critics nonetheless argue that punitive damages threaten to over-penalize 
a tortfeasor, particularly since they conflate notions of tort law and criminal 
law, and that this threatens to further disrupt the social balance.174  This 
concern, while certainly legitimate, should be tempered in the French context 
for two reasons.  First, there is a much stronger link between criminal law 
and tort law in the French legal system than in the American system.175  As 
will be discussed later in this Article, there is a more fluid boundary between 
criminal and tort law in the French context, even allowing tort victims to 
bring their tort claims in criminal courts in some cases.176  Second, the 
concern of over-penalization through the award of exorbitant punitive 
damages is less likely to occur in France where the French Court of 
Cassation has a well-established practice of overturning excessive damage 
judgments that lack justification.177  Since the Avant-Projet’s proposal 
requires judges to provide an explanation for their punitive damage awards, 
there is an additional safeguard to better ensure that the damages awarded 
provide full reparation for the victim and society while being commensurable 
with restoring the moral balance.  
Given the potential for punitive damages to advance social policy and 
provide redress for the public at large, their introduction into the French legal 
system is consistent with the principles underlying existing French tort law. 
                                                                                                                   
 173 Wilcox, supra note 9, at 26. 
 174 See, e.g., Grass, supra note 165, at 242–43. 
 175 Viney, supra note 32, at 239; see, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for 
judicial matters] crim., Dec. 8, 1906, rapport Laurent-Atthalin, note Demogue (holding that 
the public prosecutor is compelled to launch a public action when a victim brings a civil 
action arising from harm caused by a criminal infraction). 
 176 Viney, supra note 32, at 239; see, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for 
judicial matters] crim., Feb. 8, 1983, Bull. crim., No. 46 (ruling on civil damages stemming 
from criminal action in a criminal case). 
 177 Viney, supra note 32, at 261; see, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for 
judicial matters] 2e civ., Nov. 28, 1962, Bull. civ., No. 756 (overturning a lower court verdict 
that lacked sufficient justification of the damages awarded for moral harm); see also CODE 
CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 1152 (allowing judges to invalidate liquidated damages clauses in contracts 
when the amount is “manifestly excessive or inadequate”). 
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D.  Retribution 
Although retribution is not explicitly recognized as a guiding principle in 
French tort law, as previously noted, a growing number of scholars have 
suggested that French courts may implicitly be looking beyond principles of 
full reparation and corrective justice, and awarding damages of a retributive 
nature.178  While retribution is often associated with punishing the tortfeasor 
for the wrong he or she committed, retribution has a strong moral 
dimension.179  As Owen notes, though at first it may seem strange that a legal 
system would be based on a sort of “private revenge,” retribution is 
appropriate because it protects two of the most fundamental values that 
support the law—freedom and equality.180 
Punitive damages serve an expressive purpose, conveying the 
community’s outrage resulting from the tortfeasor’s misconduct.  Deriving 
from the social roots of the law, they promote what society believes ought to 
be the correct relationship between its members by censuring behaviors that 
invade the rights of others.181  In the recent United States Supreme Court 
case of Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, for example, the Court held that the 
consensus today that punitive damages can serve a retributive purpose 
informs the modern doctrine and provides a partial answer for why most 
American jurisdictions support their award.182  The Court thus noted that 
punitive damages may be especially appropriate in cases where there is a 
high degree of blameworthiness.183 
Critics, however, charge that assigning tort law a retributive function 
conflates tort law and criminal law.184  Whereas criminal law is supposed to 
be about retribution and punishment, tort law’s aim should be 
compensation.185  In light of the French commitment to full reparation,186 
punitive damages thus may seem incompatible with the underlying rationale 
of French tort law.  This erroneous conclusion, however, fails to consider the 
                                                                                                                   
 178 Carval, supra note 68, at 822; see, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for 
judicial matters] 1e civ., Nov. 5, 1996, Bull. civ. I, No. 378 (awarding damages arguably as a 
way to punish the tortfeasor who infringed on the victim’s right to privacy even though the 
victim suffered no palpable monetary harm). 
 179 Owen, supra note 166, at 375. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Partlett, supra note 81, at 800. 
 182 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492–93 (2008). 
 183 Id. at 493. 
 184 Koziol, supra note 8, at 755–56. 
 185 See Zipursky, supra note 121, at 106 (questioning the proper role of punitive damages in 
a compensation-based and corrective justice-oriented understanding of tort law). 
 186 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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more nuanced relationship between criminal law enforcement and tort 
liability, especially in the French context. 
Although in principle criminal and tort law are two distinct institutions, a 
strong link has been made between the two institutions in the French legal 
system.  For example, the victim of a criminal infraction in France has the 
option of bringing his or her claim for compensation in an individual 
capacity in a civil court or as a subsidiary party in a criminal proceeding, 
initiated either by the public prosecutor or the victim himself or herself.187  
Even if the victim opts to bring his or her claim in the civil court, the 
criminal character of the source of the harm may still affect his or her redress 
and the court’s final judgment.188  Given the fluid nature of the boundary 
between criminal and tort law in the French legal system, awarding tort 
damages with a retributive purpose does not necessarily offend the principles 
underlying the French legal system. 
Moreover, punitive damages can address issues of under-punishment in 
criminal law and relieve pressures on the criminal justice system, helping to 
restore equilibrium between the tortfeasor, the victim, and society.189  
Criminal law sometimes falls short in adequately encompassing those 
situations where retribution would promote restoring the moral balance.190  
As Owen notes, when a tortfeasor violates the rights of his or her victim, he 
or she in a sense “steals” the victim’s autonomy, reflecting an assertion that 
the tortfeasor is worthier than the victim.191  Where such “thefts” of 
autonomy are not subject to penalties beyond the restoration of the “stolen 
goods” through sufficient compensatory damages, the rectification of the 
transaction is incomplete because the tortfeasor still holds the extra worth 
stolen from the victim.192  Punishment, through punitive damages, helps to 
restore the equality of the victim in relation to the thief by reaffirming the 
equal worth of all individuals in society and the duty of each person to 
respect and give equal worth to the rights of others.193 
                                                                                                                   
 187 Viney, supra note 32, at 239. 
 188 See id. at 240.  Until the end of the twentieth century, civil courts were bound by the 
findings of criminal courts such that a civil judge was essentially barred from compensating a 
victim on the basis of fault where an alleged tortfeasor was acquitted of criminal charges of 
homicide or involuntary injury. Although admittedly this rule has been largely abandoned, 
there are still certain areas (such as criminal infractions by the press) where the victim is 
prevented from bringing a civil action when the alleged tortfeasor is found not guilty of 
criminal charges.  Id. 
 189 Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34–35 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 190 Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 
42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1440–41 (1993). 
 191 Owen, supra note 166, at 376. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
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More concretely, there are numerous instances in French law where 
courts appear to have already implicitly adopted a retributive dimension in 
assessing tort damages in order to punish the tortfeasor and restore the social 
equilibrium.  For example, Jean-Sébastien Borghetti notes that judges have a 
certain amount of discretion in their reward of extra-patrimonial damages 
given the difficulty of measuring the moral harm caused by a tort.194  As a 
result, courts have taken a very liberal stance when assessing extra-
patrimonial damages, suggesting that perhaps judges not only take into 
account the injury to the victim, but also the immeasurable harm the victim 
suffered, the culpable behavior of the tortfeasor, and any illicit profits the 
tortfeasor received.195  This covert form of punishment arguably goes beyond 
according equality to the victim, satisfying an implicit push for retribution 
that appears to be influencing French courts.196  
While damage awards may help to restore the moral balance—an explicit 
goal of the French tort system—they may also serve as a way to punish a 
tortfeasor—a more implicit goal that some scholars argue is also driving the 
system.197  Rather than continue to rely on implicit mechanisms for ensuring 
victim reparation, reestablishment of the social equilibrium, and punishment 
of the tortfeasor, French tort law could use punitive damages to design a 
more coherent and explicit framework for filling existing gaps in the tort 
system.  By providing a form of compensation that accounts for the 
blameworthiness of the tortfeasor’s actions and moral harm to the victim, 
punitive damages not only serve to punish the tortfeasor, but also promote 
the explicit goals of the French tort system, namely full reparation and social 
fairness. 
E.  Deterrence 
In contrast to retribution, which looks back at the actions of the 
wrongdoer and aims to punish him or her for his or her misconduct, 
deterrence aims to influence the future behavior of the wrongdoer and 
society at large.  Proponents of the deterrence model generally emphasize an 
economic perspective of tort law, arguing that accurate judgments about the 
                                                                                                                   
 194 Borghetti, supra note 8, at 63; see, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for 
judicial matters] 2e civ., Dec. 16, 2011, pourvoi No. 10-15947 (unpublished) (rejecting an 
appeal to overturn a court of appeal’s award of €19,500 in extra-patrimonial damages to an 
employee exposed to asbestos). 
 195 Borghetti, supra note 8, at 63–64. 
 196 Id. at 64.  For sources examining the influence of retribution in awarding punitive 
damages, see Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 
957, 1006–07 (2007) and Partlett, supra note 81, at 801. 
 197 Borghetti, supra note 8, at 63. 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2013  9:53 AM 
2013] PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN FRANCE 419 
 
 
costs and utility of conduct will produce an economically efficient social 
system of conduct.198  The deterrence model is thus often juxtaposed against 
the corrective justice model, which emphasizes the wrongfulness of tortious 
conduct and seeks to remedy disparities between parties caused by culpable 
and injurious conduct.199  In light of the seeming incompatibility between 
these two models, many critics of punitive damages in France contend that if 
deterrence is the underlying rationale for punitive damages, these damages 
clash with the French commitment to corrective justice.200  
Numerous scholars, however, have argued that deterrence and corrective 
justice are not necessarily mutually exclusive models.201  Drawing on similar 
debates in the criminal law context, Gary Schwartz describes how a more 
nuanced understanding of the interactions between deterrence and corrective 
justice can provide a fuller explanation for the doctrines.202  In fact, Schwartz 
ultimately concludes that the two models may actually provide support for 
one another rather than opposition.203  Extrapolating this conclusion beyond 
the criminal law context, tort law can also arguably be an instrument with 
goals of both deterrence and corrective justice.204  In the French context, for 
example, deterrence can serve to support the explicit French commitment to 
corrective justice.  Moreover, deterrence may serve as an independent 
rationale for awarding damages that, while not explicitly embraced by the 
French legal system, has at least implicitly guided courts in some cases.205  
More specifically, deterrence is often aimed at ensuring tortfeasors 
internalize the full social costs of their behavior so that they are dissuaded 
from engaging in “economically inefficient behavior,” defined as behavior 
                                                                                                                   
 198 Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33–34 (1972). 
 199 Christopher J. Robinette, Can There be a Unified Theory of Torts? A Pluralist Suggestion 
from History and Doctrine, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 369, 370 (2005). 
 200 E.g., BACACHE-GIBEILI, supra note 23, at 486–87. 
 201 See, e.g., Brian L. Church, Balancing Corrective Justice and Deterrence: Injury 
Requirements and the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 60 ALA. L. REV. 697, 703 
(2009) (“Ultimately, no one theory of tort can be used in all circumstances to the exclusion of 
others.  While an ideological world may desire a contrary result, some scholars recognize that 
each theory can coexist with the others.”); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: 
Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1815–16 (1997) 
(“Given the evident similarities in the sets of rationales available in criminal law and in tort 
law, the discussions of mixed theories by criminal law scholars should certainly be of interest 
to tort scholars.”). 
 202 Schwartz, supra note 201, at 1801–02, 1824–25.  
 203 See id. at 1824 (arguing that a mixed theory of tort law would “impose[ ] or assign[ ] 
liability for proper deterrence reasons–unless this result [was] not compatible with the 
criterion of corrective justice”). 
 204 Id. at 1801. 
 205 Borghetti, supra note 8, at 63, 66–68. 
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that imposes more costs than benefits on society.206  Whereas specific 
deterrence is targeted at dissuading the individual tortfeasor from committing 
the same wrongful act again in the future,207 general deterrence extends to 
society at large.208  In both cases, the imposition of punitive damages derives 
from the concern that tortfeasors often escape liability for the full social costs 
of their wrongs because victims frequently face challenges in identifying the 
tortfeasor, bringing suit, and collecting full damages.209  Punitive damages 
can thus help achieve optimal deterrence by ensuring tortfeasors are held 
liable for the full damages they cause and by offsetting certain subjective 
gains to the tortfeasor that are not ordinarily counted in the utility calculus.210 
At the same time, however, critics charge that punitive damages do little 
to restore the moral balance and both over- and under-deter, making them 
grossly unfair.211  Critics point to cases like State Farm Mutual Auto 
Insurance as evidence that punitive damages are often “arbitrary” and 
“grossly excessive.”212  They argue that if punitive damages are really meant 
to promote optimal deterrence by, for example, disgorging tortfeasors of ill-
gotten gains, the French legal system and the law of unjust enrichment 
already achieve this goal.213 
                                                                                                                   
 206 Colby, supra note 92, at 468. 
 207 See, e.g., Seltzer v. Morgan, 154 P.3d 561, 597 (Mon. 2007) (finding that the deterrent 
effect of a punitive damage award against a tortfeasor will depend on the individual’s 
financial means). 
 208 See, e.g., BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (noting that a state may 
impose punitive damages “to further its legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and 
deterring its repetition”). 
 209 Sunstein et al., supra note 22, at 2082. 
 210 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 
228, 229–31 (Michael Faure ed., 2009). 
 211 Koziol, supra note 8, at 754; see also Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in “Punitive” 
Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REV. 831, 839 (1988) (“Punitive 
damages, partly because of the lack of structure . . . may overdeter or underdeter bad conduct, 
and in any event, for some of the same reasons, may be grossly unfair in many particular 
cases”). 
 212 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (holding that a 
$145 million punitive damages award was arbitrary and grossly excessive when compared to 
only $1 million in compensatory damages, thus violating the due process clause); Koziol, 
supra note 8, at 754–57. 
 213 Koziol, supra note 8, at 760; see Ana Vohryzek, Unjust Enrichment Unjustly Ignored: 
Opportunities and Pitfalls in Bringing Unjust Enrichment Claims Under ICSID, 31 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 501, 508–09 (2009) (discussing the law of disgorgement in France and 
explaining how the French legal system caps the plaintiff’s award for unjust enrichment at the 
amount of the plaintiff’s loss, not the defendant’s gain).  It should be noted that, while the 
theory of unjust enrichment has been accepted in various areas of French law, it has not 
received wholesale acceptance across the legal system.  Brice Dickson, Unjust Enrichment 
Claims: A Comparative Overview, 54 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 100, 113 (1995). 
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Although critics are quick to suggest that the deterrence rationale for 
punitive damages is problematic and incompatible with French tort law, they 
fail to consider how deterrence may actually support the explicit corrective 
justice goals of the tort system.  Like Schwartz notes, deterrence and 
corrective justice should be recognized as collaborators rather than 
competitors.214  For example, under the deterrence rationale, because 
punitive damages may force tortfeasors to more fully internalize the costs of 
their actions,215 tort law is better able to meet its goals of maintaining 
equilibrium between members of society and reestablishing the status quo 
disrupted by the tortious act.216  This is especially true in the case of what 
academics call fautes lucratives (lucrative faults).217  Because the tortfeasor 
of a lucrative fault knows that he or she will still benefit from the misconduct 
even if held liable and forced to compensate the victim, punitive damages 
can help ensure a more optimal level of deterrence, maintaining the moral 
balance.218  Even Helmut Koziol, a staunch critic of punitive damages, 
admits that the law of unjust enrichment often fails to adequately account for 
these wrongful gains.219  This is in part because the tortfeasor may not be 
caught and, even if caught, will sometimes be required to pay compensation 
that is less than his or her total gain.220  Similarly, as Posner suggests in 
Kemezy, because compensatory damages do not always fully compensate the 
victim, tortious conduct is often under-deterred unless the tortfeasor faces 
additional costs through the payment of something like punitive damages.221   
There is thus a close relationship between the compensatory and deterrent 
objectives of tort law.222  Punitive damages can promote more optimal 
deterrence, ultimately supporting maintenance of the social equilibrium, an 
underlying goal of the French tort system.223  Furthermore, although 
achieving optimal levels of deterrence and ensuring fair awards is admittedly 
difficult, further legislation and guidance may help both to address the 
potential issues that arise in properly fashioning damage awards and to 
                                                                                                                   
 214 Schwartz, supra note 201, at 1834. 
 215 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 210, at 230–31. 
 216 Azarnia, supra note 32, at 489. 
 217 Fasquelle & Mesa, supra note 66, at 360.  Lucrative faults are voluntary violations of 
legal rules or duties that are committed by an individual who knows he or she will be subject 
to less liability than the profit likely to be made by committing the violation.  Id.  
 218 Borghetti, supra note 8, at 68. 
 219 Koziol, supra note 8, at 758–59. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 222 Id. 
 223 See Azarnia, supra note 32, at 488-89 (noting that one of the goals of tort law is to 
“reestablish the status quo which was ruptured by the tortious act”). 
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ensure that punitive damages meet the French tort system’s explicit 
corrective justice goals.224  As will be discussed later, certain changes to the 
Avant-Projet’s current proposal may help to better ensure that punitive 
damages are awarded in a way that is consistent with goals of victim 
reparation and corrective justice. 
Beyond simply supporting the corrective justice rationale, however, 
deterrence can also serve the independent goal of discouraging potential 
tortfeasors from engaging in tortious conduct.225  Although most scholars 
agree that deterrence is not an underlying goal of French tort law, others like 
Suzanne Carval forcefully argue that French judges may already be 
implicitly engaging in a sort of deterrence-motivated analysis in assessing 
damage awards in some cases.226  For example, Borghetti contends that 
French courts have implicitly adopted a deterrence-based rationale in tort 
cases where newspaper companies infringe on a person’s right to privacy in 
order to sell more copies of their newspapers.227  Although in many of these 
cases the goal of full reparation could be achieved without disgorging the 
company of all illicit profits, it is widely believed that courts try to deprive 
the company of its illicit gains in hopes that it and other companies will be 
deterred from engaging in the same sort of tortious behavior again.228  
Rather than continue to have courts covertly take into account deterrent 
considerations in fashioning their rewards, the Avant-Projet’s proposal 
requires courts to be more explicit about when they are giving awards of a 
more deterrent nature.  This frankness will bring more clarity to the law and 
better ensure that it meets its goals, including both explicit goals of victim 
reparation and corrective justice, and more implicit goals of retribution and 
deterrence.  As the Court of Cassation itself has noted in numerous cases,229 
                                                                                                                   
 224 For a summary of some of the legislative approaches adopted in the United States, see 
DOBBS, supra note 7, § 384. 
 225 Carval, supra note 68, at 822. 
 226 Id; see, e.g., Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Versailles, 1e ch., May 4, 
2000, pourvoi No. 98-21992 (unpublished) (awarding ₣50,000 to the plaintiff factory worker 
who was fired after she was no longer able to work for medical reasons in part because of her 
employer’s “misuse of power”). 
 227 Borghetti, supra note 8, at 67; see, e.g., Tribunaux de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary 
court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 1e ch., Dec. 17, 1986, Gaz. Pal. 1987, 1, 238 (cited in 
Borghetti, supra note 8, at 64).  In the case, the court awarded ₣200,000 to the heir of the 
French throne as compensation for the damages he suffered after a newspaper ran a story 
accusing him of squandering his family’s fortune.  According to Borghetti, such an amount 
“grossly overestimate[d]” any damage the victim suffered and could “only be explained as an 
attempt to deprive the tortfeasor of the profit he had made and to deter him from publishing 
any such articles in the future.” Borghetti, supra note 8, at 67. 
 228 Borghetti, supra note 8, at 67. 
 229 See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ., Jan. 4, 
2012, pourvoi No. 11-10239 (unpublished) (dismissing the defendant’s appeal of a judgment 
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judges make “global assessments” of damage awards and are not required to 
break down awards between the different claims asserted.230  Combined with 
the large discretion given to judges in assessing damage awards, critics argue 
that this method is inherently arbitrary and fails to create any sort of check to 
determine whether the full reparation principle is being respected.231  
In adopting punitive damages, the Avant-Projet’s proposals would make 
more explicit the principles that should be guiding judicial decisions and 
allow courts and the legislature to create rules to better ensure fairness and 
transparency.  Rather than continuing to operate in a system where courts 
seem to be guided implicitly by principles like deterrence, judges would have 
a clear understanding of the purposes for awarding damages and a set of 
tools and rules for better achieving those purposes.  The formal introduction 
of punitive damages is thus an opportunity to make explicit when and how 
deterrence—which is arguably already at work in the French system232—
should be considered in setting a damage award. While deterrence might at 
first seem inconsistent with more explicit principles of French tort law, it can 
both support principles of full reparation and corrective justice and serve as 
an independent rationale for awarding damages. 
F.  Understanding the Rationales and Moving Forward 
Proponents and critics of punitive damages offer many justifications and 
critiques for their award.  Punitive damages not only provide a form of 
redress for victims and society at large, but they also have retributive and 
deterrent purposes.  In light of existing judicial practices and the various 
rationales for awarding punitive damages, it is perhaps not so surprising that 
the authors of the Avant-Projet sought to officially recognize and introduce 
                                                                                                                   
against it for €10,000 for the damages the plaintiffs sustained when they were delayed in 
moving to a new home because of the defendant’s actions, despite the lower court granting a 
global award without specifying the amount awarded for each individual claim). 
 230 Anziani & Béteille, supra note 15, at III. D.  L’Évaluation du préjudice et la liquidation 
des dommages et intérêts.  As Anziani and Bétaille note, global assessments of damage 
awards have come under increasing scrutiny.  For example, Alain Bénabent, a lawyer at the 
Council of State and Court of Cassation, described the assessment of damages as the Achilles’ 
heel of the law of civil responsibility.  Similarly, Professor Fabrice Leduc criticized the 
disparate and sometimes arbitrary nature of judicial damage awards, arguing it leads to 
inequality. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Borghetti, supra note 8, at 56–66; see, e.g., Tribunaux de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary 
court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 1e ch., Jan. 16, 2008 (cited in Borghetti, supra note 8, at 
65) (awarding damages to a non-profit environmental organization for extra-patrimonial harm 
suffered as a result of an environmental disaster).  According to Borghetti, the damages in the 
case had a “clearly punitive function.” 
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punitive damage awards into French tort law as a “weapon” in the legal 
system’s arsenal for achieving its goals.  Bearing in mind the reasons 
generally offered in favor of punitive damages and the potential for punitive 
damages to advance the French tort system’s purposes, further examination 
of the Avant-Projet’s draft provision for punitive damages is warranted. 
IV.  UNDERSTANDING ARTICLE 1371: APPLICATION AND REFINEMENT  
Analysis of the scope of Article 1371 of the Avant-Projet, including a 
discussion of how the Article can be better tailored to fit within the French 
tort system, suggests that punitive damages may be a welcome addition to 
French tort law.  As the drafters note, the provision “cautiously opens the 
way for the reward of punitive damages.”233  It states: 
A person who commits a manifestly deliberate fault, and 
notably a fault with a view to gain, can be condemned in 
addition to compensatory damages to pay punitive damages, 
part of which the judge may in his or her discretion allocate to 
the Public Treasury.  A judge’s decision to order payment of 
damages of this kind must be supported with specific reasons 
and their amount distinguished from any other damages 
awarded to the victim.  Punitive damages may not be the object 
of insurance.234 
Drawing again on a comparative approach, this section aims to further 
understand the essential components of the provision and to identify parts of 
the new law that may require further consideration. 
A.  The Tortfeasor and Fault 
Article 1371 provides that punitive damages may be awarded to “[a] 
person who commits a manifestly deliberate fault, and notably a fault with a 
view to gain . . . .”235  As use of the term “manifestly deliberate” would seem 
to suggest, a central component of the Article is that the tortfeasor must 
intend to commit the fault.  Consistent with the principle of full reparation, 
“fault with a view to gain,” defined as “a fault whose beneficial 
consequences for its perpetrator would not be counteracted by the simple 
                                                                                                                   
 233 Avant-Projet de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la prescription, supra 
note 13, Sous-Titre III, Exposé des motifs, s. 6. 
 234 Id. art. 1371. 
 235 Id. 
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reparation of the harm caused,”236 presents a particularly strong case for 
awarding punitive damages.237  Although Solène Rowan notes that there is 
some debate as to the precise meaning of this definition, consensus among 
French academics suggests that a tortfeasor must intend to make a profit, 
even after any potential liability to compensate the victim is taken into 
account.238  While this understanding may appear to narrow the scope of the 
instances where punitive damages may be awarded, it is important to note 
that “fault with a view to gain” is only a preponderant instance of 
“manifestly deliberate fault” and not an exclusive list of all possible actions 
that would fall under the Article.239  Thus, it seems possible that a court 
could award punitive damages where a tortfeasor was not acting with the 
motive of gain, but simply with deliberation. 
In light of the current ambiguity about what constitutes “manifestly 
deliberate fault,” further explanation of whether punitive damages would be 
appropriate where a tortfeasor acts not for profit but in a malicious manner 
would be helpful.240  Given the French commitment to corrective justice and 
restoring the moral balance,241 extending punitive damages to situations 
where a party acts with malice would appear to be a logical extension of the 
doctrine, even if the tortfeasor is not acting with the motive of gain.  
Awarding punitive damages in cases where a tortfeasor commits a manifestly 
                                                                                                                   
 236 Id. Sous-Titre III, Exposé des motifs, s. 6.  
 237 Id. art. 1371. 
 238 Solène Rowan, Comparative Observations on the Introduction of Punitive Damages in 
French Law, in REFORMING THE FRENCH LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 325, 328–30 (John Cartwright, 
Stefan Vogenauer & Simon Whittaker eds., 2009). 
 239 Id.; Avant-Projet de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la prescription, supra 
note 13, art. 1371. 
 240 In the United States, for example, punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is 
“outrageous,” whether the tortfeasor’s acts are done with an evil motive or reckless 
indifference to the rights of others.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. b (1979).  
In contrast, English courts award punitive damages in three situations: (1) where there is 
“oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants of the government”; (2) where 
“the defendant’s conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which may 
well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff”; and (3) where “expressly authorised 
by statute.” Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.).  The second category is thus most 
closely analogous to the French formulation, although notably fails to provide for recovery 
where the tortfeasor’s conduct is malicious.  It is important to note, however, that the English 
categorical approach has come under increasing attack, leading some commentators to argue 
for its replacement by a more general principle.  See, e.g., Anthony Sebok & Vanessa Wilcox, 
Aggravated Damages, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW PERSPECTIVES, 
supra note 8.  In contrast with English law, the Avant-Projet avoids announcing categories of 
conduct that would trigger punitive damages.  This is unsurprising given the French tendency 
to impose broad, guiding rules instead of specific rules aimed at resolving specific situations.  
See Azarnia, supra note 32, at 475. 
 241 Azarnia, supra note 32, at 488–90. 
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deliberate fault, whether for profit or with malice, is consistent with the 
underlying principles of French tort law because it helps to restore the social 
equilibrium and promotes full reparation by recognizing that a particularly 
egregious tort was committed and providing a form of compensation for the 
immeasurable moral harm the victim suffered. 
B.  Damages 
Similarly, the allocation of damages under Article 1371 further advances 
the goals of French tort law by better providing for full compensation and 
social redress, but requires more clarification.  According to Article 1371, a 
court’s decision to award punitive damages “must be supported with specific 
reasons and their amount distinguished from any other damages awarded to 
the victim.”242  A positive implication of this component of the provision is 
the likely development of a body of case law, enabling a better understanding 
of when punitive damages are awarded and the amount of such awards.243  
The resulting increase in transparency and monitoring may also alleviate 
concerns that punitive damages could be applied in an arbitrary and 
unpredictable manner.244  Nevertheless, at least initially, the requirement of 
distinguishing punitive damages from other damage awards may prove 
challenging for French judges who are largely unaccustomed to setting out 
their methods for quantifying damages.245  Requiring judges to explain their 
damage awards, however, provides a crucial mechanism for promoting 
consistency in decision-making and helps to maintain the social equilibrium, 
one of the goals of French tort law.246 
In addition to the difficulties associated with requiring judges to provide 
an explanation for their damage awards, a major criticism leveled against the 
Avant-Projet proposal is that consistency in the award of punitive damages 
would be precarious because Article 1371 fails to articulate any criteria 
courts should take into account when awarding punitive damages.247  A 
                                                                                                                   
 242 Avant-Projet de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la prescription, supra 
note 13, art. 1371. 
 243 Rowan, supra note 238, at 333. 
 244 See, e.g., Yvonne Lambert-Faivre, Les effets de la responsabilité (les articles 1367 à 1383 
nouveaux du Code civil), 1 REVUE DES CONTRATS 163, 164 (2006) (suggesting that punitive 
damages should be rejected in France in part because they are of an inherently arbitrary nature); 
see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 63 (1991) (noting that a punitive damages 
scheme providing at best “skeletal guidance . . . invites—even requires—arbitrary results”).  
 245 CARVAL, supra note 59, at 360. 
 246 Azarnia, supra note 32, at 488. 
 247 See generally CONSEIL NATIONAL DES BARREAUX, PROJET DE RAPPORT DU GROUPE DE 
TRAVAIL CHARGÉ D’ÉTUDIER L’AVANT-PROJET DE RÉFORME DU DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS ET DU 
DROIT DE LA PRESCRIPTION (2006) (“The amount of punitive damages has no limits and its 
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closer examination of the principles applied by American courts when 
awarding punitive damages may be of guidance.  Drawing on the American 
experience, French lawmakers may wish to provide criteria for judges in 
assessing punitive damages.  This would provide courts with the flexibility 
needed to adhere to principles underlying French tort law such as full 
reparation and the promotion of corrective justice, while also promoting 
greater consistency across cases.   
In assessing punitive damages in the American context, consideration is 
given to factors such as the character of the tortfeasor’s act, the nature and 
extent of harm to the victim, the wealth of the tortfeasor, whether criminal 
penalties have been imposed, the extent of any profit made by the tortfeasor, 
and the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages.248  
American judges, much like their French counterparts who generally oppose 
standardized damage formulas and tables,249 have largely resisted articulating 
a ratio between compensatory and punitive damages.250  Consistent with this 
practice, however, criteria could nonetheless still be provided to French 
courts to use when setting punitive damages.    
Establishing criteria for the award of punitive damages would also help 
combat the potential for excessive damage awards, a criticism leveled against 
punitive damages in the American context.251  Although the anxiety 
associated with excessive awards should be tempered in the French context 
where judges, not juries, set damages, the Avant-Projet attempts to address 
this concern by requiring judges to fully explicate their awards.252  Providing 
                                                                                                                   
determination by the trial court is not subject to review by the Court of Cassation.”).  
 248 See, e.g., BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–85 (1996) (laying out 
“guideposts” for courts when reviewing punitive damages awards); Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 
33, 34–36 (7th Cir. 1996) (articulating seven factors to consider when awarding punitive 
damages); Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223–25 (Ala. 1989) (articulating a 
similar set of factors for determining an appropriate punitive damages award); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).  
 249 Borghetti, supra note 8, at 63. 
 250 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 424–25 (2003) (“We 
decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed.”).  
 251 See, e.g., Steve Calandrillo, Penalizing Punitive Damages: Why the Supreme Court 
Needs a Lesson in Law and Economics, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774, 802 (2010) (“[S]ound 
economic analysis dictates that imposing punitive damages well beyond actual harm simply 
because a tortfeasor’s behavior was reprehensible can inadvertently lead to overdeterrence, 
price inflation beyond optimum, quality of good purchased below optimum, and a significant 
reduction in overall social welfare.”). 
 252 See generally Neil Vidmar & Mirya Holman, The Frequency, Predictability, and 
Proportionality of Jury Awards of Punitive Damages in State Courts in 2005: A New Audit, 43 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 855, 881 (suggesting that both judicial gate-keeping and reduction in jury 
awards can serve to constrain punitive damages); Avant-Projet de réforme du droit des 
obligations et du droit de la prescription, supra note 13, art. 1371. 
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judges with criteria for assessing when punitive damages should be awarded 
and in what amount provides an additional safeguard for ensuring that their 
award properly serves the goals of the French tort system. 
Nevertheless, despite already existing and potential safeguards, critics 
continue to raise concerns that punitive damages may still risk compensating 
victims beyond full reparation, undermining the principle of equivalency that 
guides French tort law.253  Article 1371 attempts to combat this potential 
problem by allowing the judge “in his or her discretion [to] allocate [part of 
the punitive damages award] to the Public Treasury.”254  This achieves a 
compromise between two imperfect solutions while promoting the goals of 
French tort law.  On the one hand, if the full award was diverted to the state, 
the victim would have no incentive to bring the claim, he or she may remain 
undercompensated, and the benefits of supporting punitive damages would 
be lost.255  On the other hand, if punitive damages were conferred solely to 
the victim, he or she would stand to receive a substantial windfall, potentially 
violating the principle of full reparation.256 Similar “split-recovery” schemes 
already exist in a number of American states,257 and seem consistent with 
French tort law principles, particularly in cases where the harm is suffered 
not only by the individual victim, but also the general public.258  
Regrettably, the Avant-Projet fails to provide direction on when punitive 
damages should be directed to the state and in what amount or proportion.  
                                                                                                                   
 253 See generally Lambert-Faivre, supra note 244, at 164 (“For clarity of the law, we 
advocate for the maintenance of the distinction between civil and criminal law: the 
intentionality of the offence is a matter for criminal law.”); Azarnia, supra note 32, at 488 
(“The commitment of a country’s courts in keeping punitive damages out of civil tribunals is a 
reflection of that country’s dedication to the role of tort law as a dispenser of justice and as an 
instrument geared toward the maintenance of parity between members of society.”). 
 254 Avant-Projet de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la prescription, supra 
note 13, art. 1371. 
 255 Rowan, supra note 238, at 336. 
 256 Id.  
 257 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.  In addition to denying windfall gains to 
plaintiffs, split-recovery statutes may also discourage frivolous litigation and raise revenue for 
the state.  Moreover, some academics argue that if the purpose of punitive damages is to 
remedy a violation of a public right, the penalty ought to accrue to society rather than a third 
party beneficiary.  John Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 
870, 886–87 (1976). 
 258 Split-recovery schemes can provide a mechanism of full reparation for society.  See 
generally Sharkey, supra note 93, at 391–92.  Sharkey notes that social compensation 
schemes are consistent with both the corrective justice and deterrence rationales for tort 
damages.  According to Sharkey, societal harms can be divided into two categories along a 
continuum: “specific harms” are harms that affect specific, identifiable individuals, whereas 
“diffuse harms” affect society more generally.  Considerations of the type of harm and where 
it falls on the continuum are important for determining how damages should be apportioned 
under a split-recovery scheme. 
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Moreover, if the appropriateness for giving such awards to the state is 
premised in part on vindication of a public harm, the award should perhaps 
be directed into a designated fund with the purpose of counteracting such 
harm.259  Further guidance is thus needed as to when and in what proportion 
punitive damage awards should be directed toward the state in order to better 
advance the purposes of French tort law. 
Equally important to considerations of who receives punitive damages 
awards is the question of who bears the burden of paying them.  Article 1371 
expressly states that “[p]unitive damages may not be the object of 
insurance.”260  According to the Avant-Projet’s authors, this rule ensures that 
punitive damages have their intended deterrent and retributive impact.261  
Although there is some debate whether insuring against punitive damages 
would actually undermine their purpose, the question may be more 
theoretical than practical as it would likely be difficult if not impossible to 
find an insurance company willing to sell liability insurance for punitive 
damages.262  The French Insurance Code bars all insurers from answering for 
“losses and damages caused by the intentional or fraudulent fault of the 
insured.”263  Nevertheless, because the types of fault covered in the Avant-
Projet are broader than the Court of Cassation’s interpretation of uninsurable 
“intentional fault” under the Insurance Code,264 the question of whether 
punitive damages should not be insurable is important. 
The prohibition on insuring against punitive damages seems consistent 
with the purposes for introducing these damages into French tort law.  If 
insurance were available, it could undermine some of the principles guiding 
French tort law such as the restoration of the moral balance by maintaining 
the state of disequilibrium between victims and insured tortfeasors who 
                                                                                                                   
 259 Although not completely analogous, many such funds already exist in other contexts.  
For example, in Canada, the Environmental Damages Fund provides a mechanism for 
directing funds received as a result of fines, court orders, and voluntary payments towards 
environmental rehabilitation projects.  Those who cause environmental damage pay into the 
fund and the moneys are distributed to environmental projects in the geographic region where 
the original incident occurred.   Harry J. Wruck, The Federal Environmental Damages Fund, 
5 CANADIAN ENV’T L. REP. 120 (2004). 
 260 Avant-Projet de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la prescription, supra 
note 13, art. 1371. 
 261 Id. Sous-Titre III, Exposé des motifs, s. 6. 
 262 Rowan, supra note 238, at 338–39. 
 263 CE. ASS., Art. L113-1, Law No. 81-5 of Jan. 7, 1981. 
 264 The Court of Cassation has narrowly defined the kinds of fault that are “intentional,” thus 
making them uninsurable. According to the Court, the wrongdoer must intend to commit the 
fault and the fault must be realized.  Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial 
matters] 3e civ., Oct. 7, 2008, pourvoi No. 07-17969 (unpublished). 
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escape personal liability for their actions.265  Nevertheless, it is interesting to 
note that the non-insurability of punitive damages represents the minority 
view in the United States.266  Although the insurance of punitive damages is 
prohibited in several states on public policy grounds, most states permit their 
coverage either as a matter of public policy, contract interpretation, or 
both.267  In states that prohibit insurance, courts and legislatures stress that 
insurance undermines the legal and social purposes of punitive damages.268  
As one court explained, “a person has no right to expect the law to allow him 
to place responsibility for his reckless and wanton acts on someone else.”269  
In France, similar rationales could likely be offered for barring insurance of 
punitive damages.  By requiring tortfeasors pay the cost of their tortious 
conduct out of their own pockets, the Avant-Projet would prevent tortfeasors 
from shifting responsibility to others, thus helping to restore the moral 
balance.  Similarly, by forcing tortfeasors to fully internalize the costs of 
their actions instead of passing them on to third party insurers, tort law could 
better achieve its goal of equilibrium between members of society.270  The 
provision barring insurance thus seems consistent with the principles 
underlying the French tort system and existing French law. 
C.  Summary of Article 1371 and Suggestions for Improvement 
In summary, Article 1371 attempts to lay out rules and principles for 
when punitive damages should be awarded, focusing on the relationship 
between the tort and the tortfeasor, and addressing issues of how damages 
should be determined.  Although generally consistent with the principles of 
French tort law in its current form, the Article could be improved with 
increased precision.  For example, greater clarification of what constitutes a 
“manifestly deliberate fault” and a clear elaboration of the criteria judges 
should use in assessing punitive damage awards and apportioning awards 
between the victim and the state is needed.  This would help alleviate some 
of the concerns critics raise regarding punitive damages and better ensure 
their compatibility with the goals of French tort law. 
                                                                                                                   
 265 Corbé-Chalon & Ragoff, supra note 15, at 295. 
 266 Catherine M. Sharkey, Calabresi’s The Cost of Accidents: A Generation of Impact on 
Law and Scholarship: Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L. REV. 409, 
427 (2005). 
 267 Id. 
 268 See, e.g., Lira v. Shelter Ins. Co., 903 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Colo. App. 1994) (“[P]ublic 
policy prohibits insurers from assuming any obligations for indemnity of punitive damages.  
Otherwise, the legal and social purposes for punitive damages would be defeated.”). 
 269 Nicholson v. Am. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). 
 270 Azarnia, supra note 32, at 489. 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS: CAN THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM GET “ON BOARD” 
WITH PUNITIVE DAMAGES? 
Whether legislators will choose to adopt Article 1371 in either its current 
or an amended form still remains a matter of speculation.271  By placing the 
Article in its historical and comparative context, however, one thing is clear: 
punitive damages are not fundamentally at odds with the French tort system.  
In fact, Article 1371 has the potential to advance many of French tort law’s 
underlying goals, both explicit and implicit, particularly if it is refined before 
adoption. 
In the more than two hundred years since the promulgation of the Civil 
Code, the French legal system has continued to evolve and adapt to changing 
circumstances, maintaining its strong commitment to the principles of 
corrective justice and full reparation of the victim in the tort law context.  
Punitive damages offer a useful tool for the further promotion of these 
explicit goals.  At the same time, punitive damages can also serve to punish 
and deter reprehensible conduct, goals that may already be implicitly guiding 
French tort law both independently and as a way to ensure the social and 
moral balance is restored and victims are made whole. 
The potential utility of punitive damages, however, may be weakened by 
Article 1371’s failure to provide sufficient guidance on how punitive 
damages should operate in practice.  This lack of direction threatens to create 
a disconnect between punitive damages and the fundamental principles in the 
French tort system, undermining their use and creating unnecessary 
controversy. 
While punitive damages have faced significant critique in France and 
most other civil law jurisdictions, there are indications that the tides may be 
changing.  A recent study from Germany, for example, reveals that, like in 
France, Germany’s steadfast opposition to punitive damages may be 
eroding.272  Similarly, a Spanish court recently enforced an American 
                                                                                                                   
 271 Rowan, supra note 238, at 343.  A bill strongly influenced by the Avant-Projet that 
supported punitive damages was introduced into the upper chamber of Parliament (le Sénat) in 
2010.  Proposition de loi n° 657 portant réforme de la responsabilité civile, Sénat, July 9, 
2010, available at http://www.senat.fr/leg/ppl09-657.html.  Although Article 1386-25 of that 
bill would have allowed judges to award punitive damages for lucrative faults in certain 
circumstances, the bill was not discussed before a new Parliament was elected.  The idea of 
awarding damages of a punitive nature for lucrative faults was, however, also endorsed in 
another reform project in 2011 supported by the Ministry of Justice.  FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, POUR 
UNE RÉFORME DU DROIT DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE (2011).  While the project does not 
endorse punitive damages, Article 54 would allow a judge to give illicit profits to the victim in 
cases of lucrative faults. 
 272 Volker Behr, Punitive Damages in American and German Law–Tendencies Towards 
Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 105, 126 (2003) 
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judgment for punitive damages, noting that, like in France, Spanish law 
permits some overlap between civil and criminal law such that punitive 
damages were not completely contrary to Spanish public policy.273 
Furthermore, Quebec’s Code civil (Civil Code) formally incorporates 
punitive damages into the province’s civil law system in some cases, 
suggesting punitive damages may be reconcilable with the principles of the 
civil law tradition in certain circumstances.274  
In France, no legislator has sought to submit the Avant-Projet’s proposals 
to the French Parliament in the eight years since the document was first 
published.  New legislation, reform projects, and the recent Fountaine Pajot 
decision, however, suggest that the debate concerning punitive damages is 
likely to continue.275  In light of the Court of Cassation’s refusal to enforce 
the American judgment in the Fountaine Pajot case, the chance for Peter 
Schlenzka and Julie Langhorne to collect their judgment and punitive 
damages award appears to have set sail; but the future of punitive damages in 
the French legal system is certainly much less clear, particularly given the 
increasing recognition that punitive damages have the potential to support 
and further the principles of French tort law. 
                                                                                                                   
(noting that while German legislation does not officially endorse the idea of punitive damages, 
there is a growing body of jurisprudence in which courts have awarded damages of a punitive 
nature). 
 273 S.T.S., Nov. 13, 2001 (Exequátur No. 2039/1999) (Spain), translated in Scott Jablonski, 
Translation and Comment: Enforcing U.S. Punitive Damages Awards in Foreign Courts–A 
Recent Case in the Supreme Court of Spain, 24 J.L. & COM. 225, 242 (2005). 
 274 C. CIV. (Q.), Art. 1621. According to Article 1621, punitive damages may not exceed the 
value necessary to fulfill their preventive purpose.  Punitive damages are assessed by taking 
into account  
all the appropriate circumstances, notably the gravity of the debtor’s fault, his 
or her patrimonial situation, the extent of the reparation for which he or she is 
already liable to the creditor and, where such is the case, the fact that the 
payment of the damages is wholly or partly assumed by a third person. 
Id. 
 275  See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
